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PACKAGE BOMBS, FOOTLOCKERS, AND 
LAPTOPS: WHAT THE DISAPPEARING 
CONTAINER DOCTRINE CAN TELL US 
ABOUT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
CYNTHIA LEE*
In the 1970s, the Court announced in a series of cases that police 
officers with probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime is 
within a container must obtain a warrant from a neutral, detached judicial 
officer before searching that container.  In requiring a search warrant, the 
Container Doctrine put portable containers on an almost equal footing with 
houses, which enjoy unquestioned Fourth Amendment protection.   
 
This Article demonstrates that the Container Doctrine is fast becoming 
a historical relic as the Court expands the ways in which law enforcement 
officers can search containers without first obtaining a warrant issued by a 
judicial officer.  Studying the numerous ways in which the Court has 
undermined the Container Doctrine is useful for several reasons.  First, the 
erosion of the Container Doctrine is emblematic of a more tectonic 
jurisprudential shift—the Court’s movement away from the Warrant 
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Preference view (the belief that the Fourth Amendment expresses a 
preference for warrants) and its gradual embrace of the Separate Clauses 
(or Reasonableness) view of the Fourth Amendment.  Second, the Court’s 
willingness to allow a growing number of container searches without 
warrants suggests a deep judicial ambivalence about the effectiveness of 
warrant formalism.  Third, the demise of the Container Doctrine, and its 
corresponding impact on the poor and homeless, reflects a troubling 
indifference to non-majoritarian interests. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II examines the longstanding 
debate over whether the Fourth Amendment expresses a preference for 
warrants or merely requires that searches and seizures not be 
unreasonable.  Part III provides background on the Container Doctrine and 
discusses its rationales.  Part IV examines the myriad ways in which police 
can lawfully search a container without a warrant.  The Court’s increasing 
willingness to tolerate warrantless searches of containers mirrors its 
gradual embrace of the Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view of the 
Fourth Amendment, the position that all the Fourth Amendment requires is 
that searches and seizures be reasonable.  Part V provides a discussion of 
why this movement away from warrants towards reasonableness in the 
container search context is problematic and what might be done about the 
situation.  This Article argues that not requiring warrants for most 
container searches hurts the poor and, by implication, poor communities of 
color, more so than the wealthy.  To rectify this unfairness, this Article 
proposes an additional layer of review in container search cases where the 
government claims the warrantless search falls within an exception to the 
warrant requirement.  Borrowing from a small slice of the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence, its “rational basis with bite” cases, this Article 
proposes that courts be non-deferential and rigorous when engaging in 
reasonableness review.  In other words, reviewing courts should employ 
reasonableness review “with teeth.” 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2010, two packages mailed from Yemen and addressed to 
Jewish synagogues in Chicago were intercepted and found to contain 
explosive material.1  One of the package bombs was found on a UPS plane 
that had stopped in England.2  The other bomb, hidden inside a printer 
cartridge, was intercepted at a FedEx facility in Dubai.3
 
1 Peter Finn, Greg Miller, & Anne E. Kornblut, Two Packages Sent from Yemen Held 
Explosives, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2010, at A1. 
  Earlier in October, 
2 Id. 
3 Peter Finn & Mary Beth Sheridan, Bomb’s Ingredients Point to Saudi Terrorist, SAN 
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2010, at A5. 
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Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, was arrested for 
conspiring to blow up Metrorail stations in the Washington, D.C. area.4  
Unattended backpacks and duffel bags on city streets in Washington, D.C. 
lead to mass evacuations and street closures as authorities seek to make sure 
the seemingly abandoned containers do not contain explosives.5
We live in a time of heightened security.  After the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the 2004 train 
bombings in Madrid, Spain, the 2005 attacks on the London transit system, 
the 2008 bombing attacks in Mumbai, India, the attempted bombing of a 
Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit by a Nigerian citizen 
with plastic explosives hidden in his underwear on December 25, 2009 (the 
attempted Christmas Day bombing), and the car bomb found in New York’s 
Times Square in May 2010, the threat of another terrorist attack is a very 
real concern.  The desire to give government officials the ability to prevent 
the loss of human life from such an attack is completely understandable.  
   
In light of valid security concerns, one might wonder why anyone 
should care about an almost forgotten doctrine that protects portable 
containers from warrantless governmental searches.  In a series of cases in 
the 1970s, the Court announced, in a rule I call the Container Doctrine, that 
police officers with probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a 
crime is within a container may seize the container, but cannot open and 
search it without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral, detached judicial 
officer.6
In this Article, I demonstrate that the Container Doctrine is fast 
becoming a historical relic as the Court expands the ways in which law 
enforcement officers can search containers without first obtaining a warrant 
issued by a judicial officer.  Studying the numerous ways in which the 
Court has undermined the Container Doctrine is useful for several reasons.  
First, the erosion of the Container Doctrine is emblematic of a more 
tectonic jurisprudential shift—the Court’s movement away from the 
Warrant Preference view (the belief that the Fourth Amendment expresses a 
  Over the ensuing years, the Court has gradually eroded the 
Container Doctrine, allowing police officers to search portable containers 
without a warrant under a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
 
4 Annie Gowen & Spencer S. Hsu, Terror Suspect’s Anger Stood Out, WASH. POST, Oct. 
30, 2010, at B1. 
5 Martin Well, Suspicious Bags Around NW Sound False Alarm, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 
2010, at B3; Rick Rojas, Suspicious Items Cause Disruptions in NW D.C., WASH. POST, July 
1, 2010, at B5 (noting that a gray suitcase left near a construction zone and a contraption 
made of pipe resulted in the closure of several blocks in Northwest D.C. to both pedestrian 
and car traffic). 
6 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763–64 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 
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preference for warrants)7 and its gradual embrace of the Separate Clauses 
(or Reasonableness)8
Why should we care about this erosion of Fourth Amendment 
protection for portable containers?  We should care because portable 
containers, like houses, are repositories for highly personal and private 
effects.  As some have argued, in protecting expectations of privacy, the 
Fourth Amendment protects a right to “control over knowledge about 
oneself.”
 view of the Fourth Amendment.  Second, the Court’s 
willingness to allow a growing number of container searches without 
warrants suggests judicial ambivalence about the effectiveness of warrant 
formalism.  Third, the demise of the Container Doctrine, and its 
corresponding impact on the poor and homeless, reflects a troubling 
indifference to non-majoritarian interests. 
9  What we keep in our purses, wallets, briefcases, and suitcases 
can reveal a great deal about our lives.  Government officials should not be 
able to search our effects without a good reason.  Those of us who use 
laptops and smartphones should be concerned when the government starts 
equating laptops and cellphones with other portable containers that can be 
searched without a warrant, as it has at the international border.10
This Article proceeds in four parts.  In Part II, I examine the 
longstanding debate over whether the text of the Fourth Amendment 
expresses a preference for warrants or merely requires that searches and 
seizures be reasonable.  For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court supported the Warrant Preference view of the Fourth Amendment—
the view that the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant 
before searching unless a clearly delineated exception to the warrant 
requirement applies.  In the last ten to twenty years, however, an 
increasingly conservative Court has moved toward the Separate Clauses or 
Reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment, the view that all the Fourth 




7 See infra text accompanying notes 
 
15–20. 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 29–31. 
9 Michael D. Granston, Note, From Private Places to Private Activities: Toward a New 
Fourth Amendment House for the Shelterless, 101 YALE L.J. 1305, 1322 (1992). 
10 See infra Part IV.E. (discussing warrantless, suspicionless searches of laptop 
computers and cell phones at the border).  
11 While most scholars refer to this approach as the Reasonableness view of the Fourth 
Amendment, I use the terms “Reasonableness” and “Separate Clauses” interchangeably 
because proponents of this view see the Fourth Amendment as having two separate clauses.  
They see the “and” in the middle of the Fourth Amendment as separating the two clauses of 
the Fourth Amendment such that one clause requires reasonableness and the other merely 
specifies the requirements for a valid warrant.  They thus conclude that all the Fourth 
Amendment requires is that searches and seizures not be unreasonable.  See infra Part II.B. 
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In Part III, I provide background on the Container Doctrine and 
discuss its rationales.  Born during the 1970s in the heyday of the Warrant 
Preference view, the Container Doctrine reflects the understanding that it is 
preferable to have a neutral and detached judicial officer, rather than a 
police officer, make the probable cause determination.  In requiring police 
officers to obtain a warrant before searching a container, the Container 
Doctrine not only reflected the Court’s embrace of the Warrant Preference 
view, it also put portable containers used to carry personal effects on the 
same footing as private homes, which as a general rule cannot be searched 
without a warrant. 
In Part IV, I examine the myriad ways in which police can lawfully 
search a container without a warrant.  Without formally abandoning the 
Container Doctrine except in the context of automobile searches, the Court 
has steadily eroded it by permitting police officers to search containers 
without a warrant under various exceptions to the warrant requirement.  The 
Court’s increasing willingness to tolerate warrantless searches of containers 
mirrors its gradual embrace of the Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view 
of the Fourth Amendment.  The Court’s path from warrant preference to 
reasonableness, however, has not been straight or smooth.  The Court has 
flip-flopped over the years, at times embracing warrants and at other times 
embracing reasonableness.  As recently as 2009, the Court expressed strong 
support for the Warrant Preference view.12
In Part V, I discuss why the movement away from warrants towards 
reasonableness in the container search context is problematic and what 
might be done about the situation.  I argue that reasonableness review, as 
currently applied, tends to be too deferential to the government and wildly 
indeterminate.  I also argue that dispensing with warrants for container 
searches disproportionately hurts the poor in general and poor communities 
of color in particular. 
  Overall, however, the trajectory 
has been away from requiring warrants in favor of mere reasonableness 
review.  This back-and-forth is also seen in the Court’s container search 
cases. 
To rectify these problems, I propose an additional layer of review in 
container search cases.  When the government claims that a warrantless 
container search was justified by an exception to the warrant requirement, 
in addition to determining whether the requirements of the exception have 
 
for more detailed explanation of the Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
12 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (“[S]earches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”). 
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been satisfied, the reviewing court must scrupulously evaluate the overall 
reasonableness of the search.  Reasonableness review comports with the 
Fourth Amendment’s command that searches and seizures not be 
unreasonable.  The reasonableness review I propose, however, is not the 
run-of-the-mill, ultra-deferential reasonableness review that courts currently 
employ.  Borrowing from a small slice of the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence—its “rational basis with bite” cases—I propose that courts 
employ non-deferential, rigorous reasonableness review.  In other words, I 
propose that reviewing courts employ reasonableness review with teeth.  
While I believe the Warrant Preference view of the Fourth Amendment is 
the view that most appropriately protects the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, I realize that the current Court is 
unlikely to go back to a strong embrace of warrants anytime soon.13
II. WARRANTS OR REASONABLENESS: THE DEBATE OVER THE MEANING OF 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
  
Therefore, even though I agree with much that critics of the Reasonableness 
approach have to say, I make my argument within the Separate Clauses 
framework in order to provide a pragmatic suggestion for protecting privacy 
interests in containers. 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides,  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 




For years, legal scholars and Supreme Court Justices have debated the 
meaning of these words.  Over time, two competing interpretations of the 
 
13 Tellingly, Justice Stevens, who retired from the Supreme Court in June 2010, authored 
the only two decisions between 2000 and the drafting of this Article in which the Court 
explicitly embraced the Warrant Preference view, and one of these cases involved the 
warrantless search of a home where warrantless searches have traditionally been viewed with 
suspicion.  See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (“Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, 
as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the 
basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 
551, 559 (2004) (“[O]ur cases have firmly established the ‘basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable. . . .”). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Fourth Amendment have emerged: (1) the Warrant Preference view, and (2) 
the Separate Clauses (or Reasonableness) view. 
A. THE WARRANT PREFERENCE VIEW 
Under the Warrant Preference view, police must obtain a warrant 
based upon probable cause before conducting a search unless an exception 
to the warrant requirement applies.15  Proponents of the Warrant Preference 
see the two clauses within the Fourth Amendment as interconnected, one 
giving meaning to the other.16  Thus, under this approach, whether a search 
is reasonable turns on whether police went to a judicial officer before the 
search to obtain a search warrant.  Under the Warrant Preference view, a 
search warrant is generally required unless a specifically delineated 
exception to the warrant requirement applies.17
Adherents of the Warrant Preference view emphasize the importance 
of having a neutral, detached judicial officer make the probable cause 
 
 
15 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. 
L. REV. 349, 396–97 (1974) (“[T]he principal check designed against the arbitrary discretion 
of executive officers to search and seize was the requirement of a ‘search warrant exacting in 
its foundation and limited in scope’; and consequently . . . a search is ‘unreasonable’ unless a 
warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.”); Tracey 
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 
925, 928 (1997) (noting that the Warrant Preference view “posits that police must ordinarily 
obtain a warrant prior to an intrusion, unless compelling reasons exist for proceeding without 
one”); George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1819, 1833 (1997) (defending the Warrant Preference view on doctrinal and historical 
grounds); see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“When the Fourth Amendment outlawed ‘unreasonable searches’ and then went 
on to define the very restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate 
could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 
‘unreasonable’ unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute 
necessity.”); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]ith minor and severely confined exceptions, inferentially a part of the Amendment, 
every search and seizure is unreasonable when made without a magistrate’s authority 
expressed through a validly issued warrant.”).  David Steinberg, in contrast, argues that the 
Warrant Preference view is not supported by historical sources and that the Framers of the 
Fourth Amendment sought to require warrants only for entries into the home, not other 
places.  David E. Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth 
Amendment History, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227, 264–65 (2005). 
16 Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 197, 203 (1993) (noting that those who favor the Warrant Preference view contend that 
“the Warrant Clause modifies the first clause—a reasonable search depends on the 
authorization of a valid warrant”). 
17 See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (“Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it 
should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic 
rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”). 
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determination—the decision that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
there is evidence of a crime in the place to be searched—rather than letting 
the police officer make this determination.18  Having a neutral judicial 
officer conduct ex ante review of a police officer’s decision to search is 
particularly important because the officer is not a neutral party in the war on 
crime.  In seeking to prevent and deter crime, the officer may see probable 
cause when probable cause is lacking.  Requiring a warrant in most cases 
helps to constrain executive power, one of the key considerations that 
motivated the Framers to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of 
Rights.19  For much of the twentieth century, the Court embraced the 
Warrant Preference view of the Fourth Amendment.20
 
18 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (“The judicial warrant . . . provides 
the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against 
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer ‘engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”). 
 
19 Maclin, supra note 15, at 970–71; see also Morgan Cloud, Pragamatism, Positivism, 
and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 298 (1993) (noting that 
“the model based upon the Warrant Clause does a better job of addressing the two 
fundamental evils that concerned the Framers,” the evil of suspicionless searches and 
seizures and excessive branch discretion). 
20 See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 559 (1999) (“For most of [the twentieth] century, the Supreme Court has endorsed what 
is now called the ‘warrant-preference’ construction of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in 
which the use of a valid warrant . . . is the salient feature in assessing the reasonableness of a 
search or seizure.”); Maclin, supra note 16, at 204 (noting that “[t]he warrant preference 
view grew in stature during the latter half of the 1960’s and the early 1970’s”); Scott E. 
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 
72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 386 (1988) (“Prior to Camara [decided in 1967], fourth amendment 
analysis had a relatively high amount of predictability: the Court presumed that a warrant 
based on probable cause was required before the police could perform a search or arrest.”); 
James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close In on the Warrant 
Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1124 (1992) (“For most of the twentieth century, 
the Court has proclaimed its faith in the principle of neutral judicial screening of executive 
decisions to search.”); see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (“Consistent with our precedent, our 
analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless 
search, with the basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.'”); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (“A warrantless search by the 
police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the 
warrant requirement.”); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (“The Fourth 
Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before conducting a search.”); 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (“Time and again, this Court has 
observed that searches and seizures conducted outside the warrant process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically and well delineated exceptions.”); United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, though 
the Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to this general rule.”); United States v. 
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In requiring law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant based on 
probable cause before searching a container, the Container Doctrine situated 
itself clearly with the Warrant Preference approach to the Fourth 
Amendment.  Requiring warrants for container searches was a bright line 
rule that was simple for an officer in the field to apply.  The Container 
Doctrine also provided clear guidance to litigants and courts.  Moreover, 
because the Container Doctrine required an ex ante judicial determination 
of probable cause, it had the advantage of interposing a neutral third party’s 
judgment on top of the law enforcement agent’s determination that there 
were sufficient grounds to justify opening the container and intruding upon 
the container owner’s expectations of privacy.  Ex ante review had the 
further advantage of avoiding “the danger that the impartiality of a 
subsequent evaluation [would] be compromised by the evidence uncovered 
during the search in question.”21
One problem with warrants is that simply requiring a warrant is often 
not sufficiently protective of Fourth Amendment interests.  As Yale 
 
 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (“It is a first 
principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search 
unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so.”); 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9 (“The judicial warrant has a significant role to play [in determining 
whether a search or seizure is reasonable] in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a 
neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the 
hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime.’”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) 
(“[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.’”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.”).  
21 Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the 
Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 553 (1997); 
see also Bryan D. Lammon, Note, The Practical Mandates of the Fourth Amendment: A 
Behavioral Argument for the Exclusionary Rule and Warrant Preference, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1101 (2007) (arguing that requiring judges to determine the legality of a search in an ex 
ante warrant proceeding results in more accurate determinations of legality than having 
judges determine the lawfulness of a search through ex post reasonableness review).  But see 
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible 
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1317 
(2005) (finding no statistically significant difference between ex ante and ex post judicial 
assessments of probable cause).  Another advantage of the warrant process is that it protects 
the innocent as well as the guilty.  Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: 
The Rise of a Public Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
375, 384 (1986) (“Unlike the exclusionary rule, which initially offers rewards only to the 
guilty, the warrant process offers its protection to innocent and guilty alike.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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Kamisar has noted, getting a warrant to search or arrest is “notoriously 
easy.”22  At some courthouses, magistrates spend less than one minute per 
warrant application.23  One study found that the average length of time a 
magistrate spends reviewing a warrant application is two minutes and forty-
eight seconds.24
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of warrant applications are 
approved.
 
25  Even in courthouses where some magistrates take their duties 
seriously and subject warrant applications to more rigorous scrutiny, police 
officers are able to get virtually all of their warrant applications approved 
by engaging in magistrate shopping—seeking out magistrates who are 
known to routinely issue warrants sought by the police.26  In one 
jurisdiction, although any one of a number of magistrates can review and 
issue search warrants, only a few magistrates end up handling the lion’s 
share of search warrant applications because officers know which 
magistrates are known for “being liberal in granting search warrants.”27  
Given the ease with which police officers can obtain a warrant, some 
scholars have lamented that “[a] search warrant now generally offers little if 
any protection against governmental invasions of private property and 
serves primarily to obviate adversarial challenge to the government’s 
claimed reason for searching.”28
 
22 Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled 
Basis” Rather Than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 570 (1983). 
 
23 Id. 
24 RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, 
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 31 (1984). 
25 Kamisar, supra note 22, at 570 n.32.  But see Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 
YALE L.J. 906, 923–30 (1986) (discussing empirical research on the search warrant process 
showing that most warrants are successful in discovering at least some of the evidence 
sought in the warrant application). 
26 Paul Sutton, The Fourth Amendment in Action: An Empirical View of the Search 
Warrant Process, 22 CRIM L. BULL. 405, 418–19 (1986) (stating that at least one person in 
each of the seven jurisdictions studied told researchers, “There are some judges who will 
sign anything”). 
27 Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: 
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 
227–28 (2000). 
28 Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s 
Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 580 (2008); see also Christopher 
Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory 
Approaches to Police Investigation, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 430 (2001) (noting that only 
five percent of warrants that are issued are subsequently found invalid). 
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B. THE SEPARATE CLAUSES OR REASONABLENESS VIEW 
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has increasingly 
embraced the Separate Clauses or Reasonableness view of the Fourth 
Amendment.29   Proponents of the Separate Clauses view focus on the fact 
that the text of the Fourth Amendment contains two clauses, separated by 
the word “and.”  The first clause (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated”) is the Reasonableness Clause, which directs 
that all searches and seizures must be reasonable.  The second clause (“and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized”) is the Warrant Clause, which specifies the 
requirements for a valid warrant.  Separate Clauses proponents see these 
two clauses as separate and completely independent.  Accordingly, under 
the Separate Clauses view, the Fourth Amendment does not require or 
express a preference for warrants.  All the Fourth Amendment requires is 
that searches and seizures be reasonable.30
 
29 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted); 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by 
[balancing].”); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s] 
‘central requirement’ is one of reasonableness.”); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71 
(1992) (“[R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard under the Fourth Amendment.”); 
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all 
state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”). 
  If a warrant is sought, it must be 
30 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 
(1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment requires searches and seizures to be reasonable, 
and that it does not require warrants, probable cause, nor the exclusion of evidence); see also 
TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969) (“[O]ur 
constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about overreaching 
warrants.”); Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1280–
93 (2010) (arguing that reasonableness, not warrants nor suspicion, serves as the 
constitutional touchstone for all governmental searches); Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: 
Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 8 (2007) (finding arguments in favor of the Reasonableness 
approach more persuasive than arguments in favor of the Warrant Preference approach).  But 
see Davies, supra note 20, at 736 (“The Framers never meant to create a relativistic notion of 
‘reasonableness’ as a global standard for assessing warrantless intrusions by officers.”); 
Maclin, supra note 16 (arguing that the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is a 
distrust of police power and discretion, not reasonableness).  For additional critiques of 
Amar’s argument, see WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND 
ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 773–77 (2009) (arguing that Amar has misread or ignored 
the available historical evidence); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and 
Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 
(1996) (critiquing Amar’s approach to criminal procedure as historically and theoretically 
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supported by probable cause, oath, or affirmation, and specify with 
particularity the places to be searched and the items to be seized.31
III. THE CONTAINER DOCTRINE 
 
When one hears the word “container,” one usually thinks of portable 
containers that can hold one’s personal belongings, such as suitcases, 
backpacks, and purses.  This also seems to be what the Supreme Court has 
in mind when it uses the term in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.32
The Court, however, has defined the term “container” much more 
expansively, providing that a container is “any object capable of holding 
another object.”
 
33  Under this definition, a jacket with pockets is a container 
because it is an object capable of holding other objects.34
The Supreme Court’s broad definition of a container for Fourth 
Amendment purposes has created an interesting paradox.  On the one hand, 
in keeping with the colloquial image of the container as a portable object 
used to carry personal items, the Court has explicitly refused to draw a 
distinction between worthy and unworthy containers, explaining that a 
traveler with a paper bag containing a toothbrush and a few articles of 
clothing has just as much a right to demand privacy from governmental 
intrusion as a business executive with a locked attaché case.
  Perhaps less 
obviously, a house is a container under this definition, since it too is an 
object capable of holding another object.  A car is a container since it is an 
object capable of holding another object.  Even the human body can be 
considered a container since the body, as drug smugglers and savvy inmates 
know, is capable of holding or concealing various objects. 
35
 
amiss); Maclin, supra note 
  In other 
words, the Court’s official policy is to treat all containers alike. 
15, at 929 (arguing that Amar provides an incomplete account of 
the Fourth Amendment’s history); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994) (arguing that our understanding of the Fourth Amendment 
must change over time to accommodate circumstances that may not have been present at the 
time the Bill of Rights was drafted); Steinberg, supra note 15, at 229 (arguing that Amar’s 
position “receives little support from historical sources”); Thomas, supra note 15, at 1824–
40 (critiquing Amar’s suggestion that the Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses should be 
read separately).  
31 Arcila, supra note 30, at 1280 (arguing that the Framers included the Warrant Clause 
in the Fourth Amendment not to create a presumptive warrant requirement but “to strictly 
limit the grounds upon which warrants could issue”). 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (paper bag); Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U.S. 753 (1979) (suitcase); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (footlocker). 
33 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981). 
34 Id. at 462–63 (allowing warrantless search of zippered pocket of black leather jacket 
found on the back seat of vehicle). 
35 Ross, 456 U.S. at 822. 
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On the other hand, if we look closely at the Court’s actual practice, we 
find that the Court is not as egalitarian in its treatment of containers as it 
proclaims to be.  In deciding which containers deserve Fourth Amendment 
protection against governmental intrusion, the Court does not treat all 
containers alike. 
Using the Court’s broad definition of what constitutes a container, we 
can think of containers as lying along a spectrum of Fourth Amendment 
protection.  Along this spectrum, houses are at the top because police 
usually need to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before they can 
enter and search a home.36  Cars are at the bottom because police officers 
may search a car without a warrant as long as they have probable cause or 
reasonable grounds to believe there is contraband or evidence of a crime in 
the car.37





36 Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 913 (2010).  Stern notes, “[t]he Supreme Court has 
defended the home as a sacred site at the ‘core of the Fourth Amendment.’”  Id. (quoting 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999)). 
  Under the Container Doctrine, police with probable cause 
37 See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 227, 275 (1984) (“In its judging of categories rather than cases, the Supreme Court has 
treated automobiles as a class apart from homes, boxes and other things that may conceal 
incriminating evidence.”).  In other contexts, however, cars are treated similarly to houses.  
For example, in the self-defense context, many states have begun applying no duty to retreat 
rules, traditionally reserved for the home, to cars.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2009); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:20(A)(3) (2010). 
38 The position of bodies on this continuum also fluctuates.  In many respects, bodies are 
treated with less respect than cars since warrantless searches of the body are routinely 
permitted.  For example, a full search of the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest is 
allowed without a search warrant or showing of probable cause to believe the arrestee is 
concealing evidence of a crime on his person.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 
(1973).  Limited pat-down frisks of a person without a warrant are allowed if the officer has 
lawfully stopped the individual and has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and 
dangerous.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  Warrantless strip searches of international 
travelers are permitted if government agents have a reasonable suspicion that the person is 
smuggling drugs into the country.  United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 
541 (1985).  School officials may strip search a high school student without a warrant if they 
have a reasonable suspicion that the search is necessary to avert danger to other students or 
that the student is concealing evidence in her underwear.  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).  Warrantless strip searches of pretrial detainees after 
contact visits are constitutional even if there is no individualized suspicion specific to the 
person being searched.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558–60 (1979).  Some lower courts 
have even permitted warrantless and suspicionless strip searches of pre-arraignment arrestees 
prior to their entering the general jail population.  See, e.g., Bull v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that San Francisco County Jail’s 
blanket strip search policy, which permitted corrections officers to perform a visual 
inspection of the breasts, buttocks, and genitalia of all pre-arraignment arrestees prior to 
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to believe evidence of a crime or contraband is within a portable container 
may seize the container but may not open or search it without first obtaining 
a warrant or court order.39  In requiring police to obtain a warrant prior to 
searching a portable container, the Container Doctrine expressed a clear 
preference for warrants, putting portable containers on almost equal footing 
with homes on the spectrum of Fourth Amendment protection.40
A. UNITED STATES V. CHADWICK 
  Over the 
years, however, the Court has gradually eroded the Container Doctrine by 
permitting police officers in numerous situations to search containers 
without a warrant.  When police are able to search a container without a 
warrant, portable containers are treated more like cars than houses.  When 
police are allowed to search a container without either a warrant or probable 
cause, containers are given even less protection than cars. 
The Supreme Court first announced the Container Doctrine in the 1977 
case of United States v. Chadwick.41  In Chadwick, Amtrak railroad 
officials in San Diego, California watched as Gregory Machado and Bridget 
Leary loaded a brown footlocker onto an Amtrak train bound for Boston, 
Massachusetts.42  They thought the trunk seemed unusually heavy for its 
size and noticed that it was leaking talcum powder, a substance used by 
drug dealers to mask the smell of marijuana or hashish.43  Amtrak officials 
reported their concerns to federal agents in San Diego who relayed this 
information along with a detailed description of the individuals and the 
footlocker to their counterparts in Boston.44
 
admission into the general jail population, was reasonable and not violative of the Fourth 
Amendment).  But see United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2007) (requiring 
reasonable suspicion that an arrestee is concealing contraband on his person for a strip search 
of that arrestee).  On the other hand, for an intrusion into the body, the Court has suggested 
that something more than a warrant based on probable cause is necessary.  See, e.g., Winston 
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that probable cause and warrant not sufficient to 
justify surgical removal of a bullet from a suspect’s body); see also Sherry F. Colb, The 
Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 
1649–50 (1998) (discussing Winston). 
  When the train arrived in 
Boston several days later, federal narcotics agents were waiting with a 
39 United States v. Chadwick,  433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 
763–64 (1979). 
40 Alschuler, supra note 37, at 277 (1984) (“After Chadwick, the warrant requirement 
apparently applied to the search of big boxes called houses and small boxes called suitcases, 
but it ordinarily did not extend to the search of middle-sized boxes called automobiles.”). 
41 Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1. 
42 Id. at 3. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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police dog trained to detect marijuana.45  The agents, who had not procured 
an arrest or search warrant, spotted Machado and Leary and watched them 
as they claimed their suitcases and the footlocker from a baggage cart.46  
When Machado and Leary placed the footlocker on the floor and sat down 
on it, the agents released the dog near the footlocker.47 The dog silently 
confirmed that the footlocker contained illegal drugs.48
A little later, Joseph Chadwick joined Machado and Leary, and the 
three engaged the assistance of an attendant to move the footlocker, which 
was locked with a padlock and a regular trunk lock, to Chadwick’s car.
 
49  
Chadwick, Machado, and the attendant lifted the 200-pound footlocker into 
the trunk of Chadwick’s car.50  While the trunk of the car was still open and 
before the car was started, the narcotics agents arrested and then searched 
the three individuals.  The agents found the keys to the locked footlocker on 
Machado.51  They then transported the three individuals and the footlocker 
and their luggage to the Federal Building.52  Approximately ninety minutes 
after the arrests, the agents opened the footlocker and found marijuana 
within.53
Chadwick, Machado, and Leary were indicted for conspiracy and 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
 
54  They moved to suppress 
the marijuana found in the footlocker.55  The District Court found that the 
warrantless search of the footlocker violated the Fourth Amendment and 
ordered the marijuana excluded.56  The Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit affirmed,57
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 
warrantless search of the locked footlocker violated the Fourth 
Amendment




 even though the government agents had probable cause to 
believe the footlocker contained controlled substances, presumably from the 
46 Id. at 3–4. 
47 Id. at 4. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 4–5. 
50 Id. at 4. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 4–5. 
54 Id. at 5. 
55 Id. 
56 United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 773 (D. Mass. 1975). 
57 United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 782 (1st Cir. 1976). 
58 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 6. 
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observations of the Amtrak officials in San Diego59 and the dog sniff of the 
footlocker.60  The Court noted that by placing personal effects in a double-
locked footlocker, the defendants had manifested an expectation that the 
contents of the footlocker would remain private.61  The Court suggested 
there was no problem with the agents seizing the footlocker since they had 
probable cause to believe there were illegal drugs within.62  However, once 
the footlocker was exclusively within the government’s control, there was 
no danger that whatever was in the footlocker would be removed by the 
defendants.63  Given the lack of any exigent circumstances supporting an 
immediate search, the Court held that government agents should have 
sought a warrant from a neutral magistrate before opening the footlocker.64  
The Court noted that the warrantless search could not be justified as a 
search incident to arrest because the search of the footlocker took place an 
hour-and-a-half after the arrest, and thus was not substantially 
contemporaneous with the arrest.65
To understand the Container Doctrine, it is useful to examine the 
Government’s arguments, which were considered but ultimately rejected by 
the Court.  The Government started by referencing the historical debate 
over the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
 
66  Invoking a strain of the 
Separate Clauses view of the Fourth Amendment, the Government 
contended that the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause protected only 
those interests traditionally identified with the home.67  The Government 
noted that the Framers adopted the Warrant Clause primarily in response to 
unjustified intrusions into private homes on the authority of colonial writs 
of assistance or general warrants.68
 
59 Id. at 3 (“Their suspicions were aroused when they noticed that the trunk was 
unusually heavy for its size, and that it was leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to 
mask the odor of marihuana or hashish.”). 
  The Government further argued there 
was no evidence that the Framers intended “to modify the initial clause of 
60 Id. at 4. 
61 Id. at 11. 
62 Id. at 13 (“The initial seizure and detention of the footlocker, the validity of which 
respondents do not contest, were sufficient to guard against any risk that evidence might be 
lost.”). 
63 Id. at 4, 13. 
64 Id. at 15–16. 
65 Id. at 15. 
66 Id. at 6. 
67 Id.  David Steinberg supports this reading of the Fourth Amendment.  Steinberg, supra 
note 15, at 264–65 (arguing that the Framers intended to require warrants only for home 
entries). 
68 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 6. 
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the Fourth Amendment by making warrantless searches supported by 
probable cause per se unreasonable.”69
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that “silence in the historical 
record tells us little about the Framers’ attitude toward the application of the 
Warrant Clause to the search of respondent’s footlocker.”
 
70  Nonetheless, 
the Chadwick Court ultimately rejected the Government’s argument, 
explaining, “We do not agree that the Warrant Clause protects only 
dwellings and other specifically designated locales.”71
[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended the Warrant Clause to operate 
outside the home, there is no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from the 
protection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the home.  The absence of a 
contemporary outcry against warrantless searches in public places was because, aside 
from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless searches were not a large issue in 
colonial America.
  Writing for the 
Court, Chief Justice Burger explained: 
72
Expressing support for the Warrant Preference view, Chief Justice 
Burger noted the “strong historical connection between the Warrant Clause 
and the initial clause of the Fourth Amendment, which draws no distinction 
among ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’ in safeguarding against 




69 Id. at 7. 
  Further linking the two clauses, 
Chief Justice Burger explained: 
70 Id. at 8–9.  While it is true that there is little in the historical record that tells us 
whether the Framers believed a warrant was necessary for a container search, there is some 
early common law support for the Container Doctrine.  Almost one hundred years before the 
Chadwick decision, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between letters and sealed 
packages, on the one hand, and newspapers and pamphlets, on the other.  Ex parte Jackson, 
96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878).  The Court in Ex parte Jackson held that postal inspectors could not 
without a warrant open letters and sealed packages to determine whether they contained 
articles that Congress had prohibited from being mailed, but could freely inspect 
newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets.  Id. at 733.  Presumably, the Court recognized the 
heightened expectations of privacy in sealed letters and packages and the warrant process as 
a means of protecting those expectations of privacy.  On the other hand, there is also some 
indication that courts in the pre-Chadwick era gave less protection to containers in cars.  
Yale Kamisar notes that until 1977, when Chadwick was decided, “it was widely assumed 
that if the circumstances authorized a warrantless search of a vehicle under the Carroll 
Doctrine [the automobile exception], they also permitted a warrantless search of luggage or 
other containers found within the vehicle.”  Yale Kamisar, The “Automobile Search” Cases: 
The Court Does Little to Clarify the “Labyrinth” of Judicial Uncertainty, in THE SUPREME 
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980–1981: AN EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF THE THIRD 
ANNUAL SUPREME COURT REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 82 (Dorothy 
Opperman ed., 1982). 
71 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7. 
72 Id. at 8–9. 
73 Id. 
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Our fundamental inquiry in considering Fourth Amendment issues is whether or not a 
search or seizure is reasonable under all the circumstances.  The judicial warrant has a 
significant role to play in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, 
which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried 
judgment of a law enforcement officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”74
The Chadwick Court concluded that by placing personal effects into a 
double-locked footlocker, the defendants manifested an expectation that its 
contents would remain free from public examination.
 
75  The Court noted, 
“No less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders, one 
who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.”76
The Government also argued that luggage is analogous to motor 
vehicles in that both are readily mobile.
  In essence, the 
Court put portable containers on an equal footing with private homes. 
77  Since the Court allows police to 
engage in warrantless searches of automobiles whenever they have probable 
cause to believe there is evidence of a crime within the vehicle, the 
Government argued that the Court should similarly allow warrantless 
searches of luggage as long as police have probable cause to believe 
evidence of a crime is within the luggage.78  The Chadwick Court rejected 
this argument as well, noting that “[t]he factors which diminish the privacy 
aspects of an automobile do not apply to respondent’s footlocker.”79  The 
Court explained that one has a lessened expectation of privacy in a motor 
vehicle because its primary function is transportation, not serving as the 
repository for one’s personal effects.80  Moreover, a motor vehicle is subject 
to pervasive regulation and travels on public thoroughfares where both its 
occupants and contents are in plain view.81  In contrast, the contents of 
luggage are not open to public view, and luggage is not subject to regular 
inspections.82
 
74 Id. at 9. 
 
75 Id. at 11. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 11–12. 
78 Id. at 12–13. 
79 Id. at 13. 
80 Id. at 12. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 12–13. 
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B. ARKANSAS V. SANDERS 
In Arkansas v. Sanders, the Court extended Chadwick to a case 
involving an unlocked suitcase in the trunk of a taxicab.83  In light of the 
fact that the footlocker in Chadwick was seized just after it was placed in 
the trunk of Chadwick’s car whereas the suitcase in Sanders was placed in 
the trunk of the taxicab and then driven several blocks before it was seized, 
the container in Sanders had a greater nexus to the vehicle than the 
container in Chadwick.  Sanders thus offered the Court the opportunity to 
clarify whether the automobile exception permitted the warrantless search 
of a container in a running motor vehicle.84
The police in Sanders received a tip from an informant who had given 
reliable information to the police in the past.  The informant told police that 
Sanders would be flying into Little Rock, Arkansas on a particular 
American Airlines flight, carrying a green suitcase that contained 
marijuana.
  It also gave the Court the 
opportunity to draw a distinction between locked and unlocked containers, 
if it so desired. 
85  Police set up surveillance at the airport, and watched as 
Sanders retrieved a green suitcase from the baggage claim area.86  Sanders 
gave the suitcase to another man who placed it into the trunk of a waiting 
taxicab.87  When the taxi drove away, the officers followed it for a few 
blocks before stopping it.88  The taxi driver opened the trunk for the 
officers.89  Without asking Sanders for permission, the officers opened the 
unlocked suitcase that was in the trunk and found 9.3 pounds of marijuana 
within.90
This time, the Government argued that the warrantless search of the 
suitcase was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, which allows law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless 
 
 
83 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565 (1991). 
84 In Chadwick, government officials seized the padlocked footlocker just after the 
defendant placed it in the trunk of his car.  433 U.S. at 4.  In Sanders, the police followed the 
taxicab which contained the suitcase at issue for several blocks before stopping the taxi and 
searching the suitcase.  442 U.S. at 755.  Writing for the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 
Justice Powell explained, “We took this case by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas to resolve some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our decision in 
United States v. Chadwick . . . to warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles.”  
Id. at 754. 
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searches of motor vehicles when they have probable cause to believe there 
is evidence of a crime within the vehicle.91  According to the Government, 
because the officers had probable cause to believe there was marijuana in 
the suitcase that was in a motor vehicle, the officers had the right to search 
the suitcase without a warrant.92
Reflecting its support for the Warrant Preference view, the Sanders 
Court rejected the Government’s argument.  The Court reiterated that “[a] 
lawful search of luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a 
warrant.”
 
93  Echoing Chadwick, the Sanders Court declined to extend the 
automobile exception to searches of luggage in automobiles for two 
reasons.  First, because the officers had seized the luggage and had it 
exclusively under their control, there was “not the slightest danger that [the 
luggage] or its contents could have been removed before a valid search 
warrant could be obtained.”94  The fact that the luggage was found in a 
taxicab, a motor vehicle, did not change the fact that the police had seized 
the luggage and had it securely within their control.95  Second, the Court 
emphasized the heightened expectations of privacy associated with luggage, 
noting that “luggage is a common repository for one’s personal effects, and 
therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.”96  The 
Sanders Court noted that a suitcase taken from an automobile “is not 
necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated 
with luggage taken from other locations.”97
One is not less inclined to place private, personal possessions in a suitcase merely 
because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by other 
means or temporarily checked or stored.  Indeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to 
serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to transport them.
  The Court explained: 
98
Writing for the Sanders Court, Justice Powell suggested in a footnote 
that “[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of 




91 Id. at 761.  For an extended discussion of the automobile exception, see infra text 
accompanying notes 
  He 
explained, “[S]ome containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun 
case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of 
privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward 
180–224. 
92 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761. 
93 Id. at 762. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 763. 
96 Id. at 762. 
97 Id. at 764. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 764 n.13. 
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appearance.”100  Justice Powell further opined that a warrant would not be 
necessary where the contents of a package are open to plain view.101
Footnote 13 in Sanders led some lower courts to draw a distinction 
between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers, or containers protected by 
the Fourth Amendment and containers not so protected,
 
102 a distinction that 
a plurality of the Court rejected in 1981.  In Robbins v. California, in 
opposing a motion to suppress fifteen pounds of marijuana found in 
packages wrapped in green opaque plastic in a recessed luggage 
compartment of a car, the State of California argued that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects only containers commonly used to transport ‘personal 
effects.’”103  It urged the Court to draw “a distinction between pieces of 
sturdy luggage, like suitcases, and flimsier containers, like cardboard 
boxes.” 104   A plurality of the Court rejected the State’s attempt to draw a 
distinction between worthy and unworthy containers, explaining that it 
would be “difficult if not impossible” to come up with objective criteria to 
draw such a distinction.105  The Court noted, “What one person may put 
into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag.”106  In response to the 
State’s objection that footnote 13 in Arkansas v. Sanders supported a 
distinction between worthy and unworthy containers, Justice Stewart 
explained that footnote 13 simply meant that if a container’s contents were 
apparent, then under the plain view doctrine, it would not be protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.107
Concurring in the Robbins opinion, Justice Powell disagreed with the 
plurality’s interpretation of footnote 13 in Sanders, which he had 
authored.
 
108  He suggested what Albert Alschuler has called a tripartite rule 
for container searches.109
 
100 Id. at 764–65 n.13. 
  Under Justice Powell’s proposed rule, police 
101 Id. 
102 Alschuler, supra note 37, at 278 (noting that Justice Powell’s statement in footnote 13 
“led some lower courts to distinguish ‘worthy containers’ whose search ordinarily would 
require advance judicial approval, from ‘unworthy containers,’ which police officers could 
search without warrants and without probable cause”); Robert A. Wainger, The Warrant 
Requirement for Container Searches and the “Well-Delineated” Exceptions: The New 
“Bright Line” Rules, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 115, 120 (1981) (“After Sanders the federal 
courts of appeals frequently distinguished containers that were analogous to luggage from 
those that were not . . . . Containers of a less substantial nature than luggage consequently 
were subject to warrantless searches.”). 
103 453 U.S. 420, 425 (1981). 
104 Id. at 425–26. 
105 Id. at 426. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 427. 
108 Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring). 
109 Alschuler, supra note 37, at 278. 
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would always need a warrant prior to searching a container “inevitably 
associated with the expectation of privacy,” such as personal luggage.110  
Police would never need a warrant to search containers that “consistently 
lack such an association,” such as plastic cups and brown paper grocery 
bags.111  For containers that may be used as repositories of personal effects 
but often are not, such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags, courts would 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the defendant manifested a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the container.112
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the size, shape, material, and condition of the 
exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and whether the possessor had 
taken some significant precaution, such as locking, securely sealing or binding the 
container, that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon 
simply mischance.
   
113
The next year, a majority of the Court laid to rest the idea that a 
distinction should be drawn between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers.  
In United States v. Ross, the Court noted that even though such a distinction 
“could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch 
buckets, and orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other, 




There are many reasons to support increased Fourth Amendment 
protection for certain containers.  Some containers are so obviously 
repositories for highly personal effects that most people would agree they 
should be accorded strong Fourth Amendment protection.  For example, 
there is near universal consensus that the home is a place where privacy 
expectations are strongest.
 
115  This is in part because the “home is a place 
where intimate things are kept from prying eyes and intimate relationships 
are carried on away from prying ears.”116
 
110 Robbins, 453 U.S. at 434 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979)). 




114 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). 
115 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (noting that the Fourth 
Amendment draws “a firm line at the entrance to the house”) (quoting Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)); Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 (requiring a warrant for an in-home 
arrest); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the State may not 
prosecute an individual for possessing obscene materials in the privacy of his or her own 
home).  Some individuals’ homes, however, are provided less Fourth Amendment protection 
than others. See infra text accompanying notes 391–430 (discussing lower court opinions 
holding that a homeless person lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home on 
public property). 
116 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 997 (1982). 
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purses with equal regard since they too are repositories for highly personal 
effects, the contents of which we would not ordinarily share with total 
strangers or even close friends.  Margaret Radin makes a convincing case 
for treating cars like homes insofar as meriting Fourth Amendment 
protection against governmental intrusion without a warrant.117  Through 
the automobile exception, the Court has “in essence declared that cars are 
generally not considered private.”118  Radin notes, however, that “[c]ars are 
the repository of personal effects, and cars form the backdrop for carrying 
on private thoughts or intimate relationships, just as homes do.”119  Most 
people would not be happy if the government could, without any 
justification or prior court approval, place a listening device in our cars and 
listen in on all of our car conversations.120
On the other hand, most of us would agree that the police should be 
allowed to take steps to determine whether an apparently abandoned or 
forgotten backpack, suitcase, or package left unattended on a public 
sidewalk or in an area frequented by many people, such as a metro station 
or airport, contains explosive material.  Law enforcement authorities, 
however, can often determine whether a package contains explosive 
material without opening it.  For example, they can use a bomb-sniffing dog 
to determine whether a piece of luggage contains explosives.  Even when it 
established the Container Doctrine, the Court recognized that exigent 
circumstances would permit the warrantless search of a container.
 
121
On balance, I think the Court is correct in refusing to draw a 
distinction between worthy and unworthy containers.  A poor person who 
cannot afford a home or a car may keep his most prized possessions in 
plastic garbage bags that others might use for their trash.  If the Court 
protects the wealthy person’s home and the containers within it from 
governmental intrusion absent probable cause and a warrant, it ought to 
protect the poor person’s garbage bags. 
 
With Chadwick and Sanders, the Court thus established the Container 
Doctrine—the rule that if police have probable cause to believe contraband 
or evidence of a crime is in a locked or unlocked container, they may seize 
 
117 Id. at 1001. 
118 Id. at 1000. 
119 Id. at 1001. 
120 Indeed, most of us would probably not like it if the government were to place a 
tracking device on our cars and follow our every driving movement.  The Court’s 
jurisprudence allows the government to do just this as long as the car stays on the public 
roads.  See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).  Since the government does not place 
tracking devices on most of our cars, the vast majority of us either do not realize that this is 
something the government can do or care enough to complain about it. 
121 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 
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that container without a warrant or consent, but cannot open it unless and 
until they have obtained a warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer who 
agrees with their assessment of probable cause, even if that container 
happens to be in a motor vehicle.122  Two justifications support the 
Container Doctrine.  First, containers are repositories for personal effects 
and therefore enjoy heightened expectations of privacy.123
 
122 As discussed below in Part IV.B., the Court later overruled Sanders while leaving 
Chadwick on the books.  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 
  Second, once an 
officer has seized a container and has it under his exclusive possession and 
control, there is little or no danger that the owner of the container will gain 
access to or destroy any evidence within the container. 
123 As recently as 2000, the Court reinforced the notion that containers enjoy heightened 
expectations of privacy.  In Bond v. United States, the Court held that an officer’s 
exploratory squeezing of a bus passenger’s duffel bag violated the passenger’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy and therefore constituted a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.  529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000).  The Court started by noting, “[I]t is 
undisputed here that petitioner possessed a privacy interest in his bag.”  Id. at 337.  It then 
found Bond’s expectation of privacy reasonable, explaining that “travelers are particularly 
concerned about their carry-on luggage; they generally use it to transport personal items that, 
for whatever reason, they prefer to keep close at hand.”  Id. at 337–38.  The Court viewed 
the officer’s action of squeezing Bond’s bag for the purpose of determining whether it was 
concealing contraband as extremely invasive, analogizing the officer’s action to a Terry frisk 
of the person: “Although Agent Cantu did not ‘frisk’ petitioner’s person, he did conduct a 
probing tactile examination of petitioner’s carry-on luggage.”  Id. at 337; see also Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968).  Notably, the Court rejected the Government’s argument 
that the officer’s action did not constitute a search because the officer was just doing what 
any bus passenger could have done.  As anyone who has flown recently knows, it is quite 
common for airline passengers seeking overhead bin space to move other passengers’ bags.  
In other contexts, the Court has held that police action does not constitute a search if the 
police officer is merely doing something any member of the public can do.  See, e.g., Florida 
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (“Any member of the public could legally have been 
flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have 
observed Riley’s greenhouse.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (“It is 
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are 
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public.”); United States v. Knotts 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (holding that use of a beeper 
to track a car’s movements on the public roads was not a search because any member of the 
public could have observed the defendant’s travels over public roads).  The Court concluded 
that “the agent’s physical manipulation of petitioner’s bag violated the Fourth Amendment.”  
Bond, 529 U.S. at 339; see also David Rudstein, “Touchy” “Feely”—Is There a 
Constitutional Difference? The Constitutionality of “Prepping” a Passenger’s Luggage for a 
Human or Canine Sniff After Bond v. United States, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 214 (2001) 
(arguing that “Bond should be interpreted broadly to encompass the physical manipulation 
by a law enforcement officer of soft-sided luggage checked with the carrier by a passenger”). 
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IV. THE DISAPPEARING CONTAINER DOCTRINE 
Over the past several decades, the Court has substantially undermined 
the Container Doctrine, permitting police to search containers without a 
search warrant, and sometimes even without probable cause.  Without 
formally overruling Chadwick’s rule that a container search ordinarily 
requires a warrant, the Court has authorized many warrantless container 
searches under various exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
In this Part, I discuss the numerous ways in which the police may 
engage in warrantless searches of containers notwithstanding the Container 
Doctrine.  I show how the steady erosion of the Container Doctrine loosely 
corresponds with the Court’s movement away from the Warrant Preference 
view of the Fourth Amendment and its gradual embrace of the Separate 
Clauses view.  Just as the Court has waffled in its broader Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence between a preference for warrants and the view 
that the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonableness, it has gone back 
and forth between these two views when deciding whether and when police 
may conduct warrantless searches of containers.  Although not explicit in 
any of its opinions, the Court’s ambivalence may reflect its skepticism 
regarding the effectiveness of warrants and a deeper recognition that 
warrants may not be as protective of privacy in practice as they are in 
theory.124
Starting with the search incident to arrest exception, this Part examines 
the various exceptions to the warrant requirement that enable police officers 
to search containers without a warrant.  The requirements needed to satisfy 
each exception are different, which is why it is best to think of these 
exceptions as distinct ways that police can search our containers without a 




A. SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS INCIDENT TO ARREST 
  More than one exception may justify the 
same search.  This is particularly true in car search cases, which can be 
validated under the search incident to arrest exception, the automobile 
exception, the consent doctrine, and the inventory search exception. 
One way police officers can search a container without a warrant is 
through the search incident to arrest exception.  The Court has long 
recognized that incident to a lawful custodial arrest, law enforcement agents 
 
124 See Part II.A. for a discussion of problems with the warrant process. 
125 Kamisar, supra note 70, at 73 (“[A]lthough conceptually distinct, in a typical case the 
Carroll Doctrine and the “search incident” exception to the Warrant Clause do overlapʊ‘the 
same probable cause that points to the likely presence of evidence in the vehicle points also 
to the likely guilt of the driver.’”). 
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may search the person of the arrestee and his wingspan, the area from which 
the arrestee might grab a weapon or destroy evidence.126  The two main 
justifications for allowing officers to perform warrantless searches incident 
to arrest are: (1) officer safety, and (2) preservation of evidence.127  
Warrantless searches incident to arrest occur more often than searches with 
a warrant.128
There are only two requirements for a valid search incident to arrest.  
First, there must be a lawful, custodial arrest, and second, the search must 
be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest.
 
129  No further justification 
beyond the probable cause needed to arrest is necessary.130
 
126 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755–68 (1969) (discussing prior search incident 
to arrest cases).  For an overview of the origins and evolution of the search incident to arrest 
exception, see Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search 
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 385–90 (2001); see also Craig M. Bradley, 
The Court’s “Two Model” Approach to the Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993) (critiquing Robinson, Belton, and Acevedo); Adam M. 
Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27 (2008) (arguing 
that given the vast amount of information contained within iPhones, iPhones should be given 
greater protection than ordinary containers under the search incident to arrest doctrine); 
Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel 
and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657 (critiquing Chimel and Belton). 
  The officer 
127 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
128 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 5.2(b) (4th ed. 2004) (“While the myth persists that warrantless searches are 
the exception, the fact is that searches incident to arrest occur with the greatest frequency.”); 
Craig M. Bradley, The “Good Faith Exception” Cases: Reasonable Exercise in Futility, 60 
IND. L.J. 287, 290 (1985) (noting that it is “well-known that far more evidence is obtained” 
through warrantless searches, including searches incident to arrest, than with warrants); 
Robert C. Fellmeth, The Optimum Remedy for Constitutional Breaches: Multiaccessed Civil 
Penalties in Equity, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 923, 946 (1999) (“Search warrants are only involved in 
a small percentage of criminal arrests.  Most searches subject to suppression dispute are 
those incident to arrest.”); Logan, supra note 126, at 382 (“[B]y far the commonest method 
of searching is incident to an arrest.”). 
129 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“It is the fact of the lawful 
arrest that establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful 
custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that 
Amendment.”); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1970) (“A search may be incident to 
arrest ‘only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the 
immediate vicinity of the arrest.’”) (quoting Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 
(1968)). 
130 The Court has substantially loosened the triggering requirements for a valid search 
incident to arrest.  For example, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court upheld a warrantless search 
under the search incident to arrest exception even though the arrest was not lawful under 
existing state law, suggesting that as long as the arrest is “constitutionally permissible,” it is 
valid for search incident to arrest purposes.  553 U.S. 164, 176 (2007) (“We have 
recognized, however, that officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally 
permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence.”).  The Court has 
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need not have probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime on the 
person of the arrestee or within the arrestee’s wingspan in order to search 
the arrestee or his wingspan.131
The rule that incident to a lawful custodial arrest, an officer may 
conduct a full search of the person was established in United States v. 
Robinson.
 
132  In Robinson, the Court held that incident to arrest, a police 
officer may conduct a full search of the arrestee, including any containers 
found on his person, even if the officer does not actually fear for his 
personal safety or believe that the arrestee will destroy evidence.133  
Robinson was stopped by an officer who, as a result of an investigation into 
Robinson’s operator’s permit a few days earlier, had probable cause to 
believe Robinson was operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his 
permit.134  After pulling over Robinson, the officer placed him under arrest 
and proceeded to search Robinson face-to-face.135  While patting him down, 
the officer felt an object in the left breast pocket of Robinson’s heavy 
coat.136  The officer reached into Robinson’s pocket, pulled out a crumpled 
up cigarette package, and opened it, finding fourteen gelatin capsules of 
white powder which he suspected was (and which turned out to be) 
heroin.137  The Court upheld the officer’s actions, holding that incident to a 
lawful custodial arrest, a police officer may conduct a full search of the 
arrestee’s person.138  The Robinson Court made clear that even though the 
search incident to arrest exception is grounded in officer safety and 
preservation of evidence rationales, the Government need not prove that the 
officer actually feared for his safety or believed the arrestee was about to 
destroy evidence in his possession.139
In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted that in focusing on the right of 
the officer to search the person of the arrestee incident to arrest, the 
 
 
also upheld warrantless searches as searches incident to arrest even when the search was not 
substantially contemporaneous with the arrest.  See, e.g., id. at 167 n.1  (noting arresting 
officers did not perform search incident to arrest immediately upon taking Moore into 
custody because each officer mistakenly believed the other had already done so); United 
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (upholding search of suspect’s clothing ten hours 
after arrest as a search incident to arrest). 
131 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.5 (b) (5th ed. 2009) (“It is the fact 
of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search . . . .”). 
132 414 U.S. at 236. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 220–21. 
135 Id. at 221–22. 
136 Id. at 223. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 235.   
139 Id. at 236. 
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majority ignored the fact that the search in question also involved the search 
of a container.140  Rooting his dissent in one of the original rationales 
behind the Container Doctrine, Justice Marshall pointed out that it would 
not have been impracticable or dangerous for the officer to have obtained a 
warrant prior to searching the cigarette package.141  Once the officer had the 
crumpled up cigarette package in his hands, it would have been virtually 
impossible for Robinson to gain access to anything within the package.142
Highlighting the possibility of unconscious class bias underlying the 
decision, Justice Marshall opined that the case may have been resolved 
differently had the defendant been a businessman or a lawyer and the 
container a wallet or a sealed envelope: 
 
One wonders if the result in this case would have been the same were respondent a 
businessman who was lawfully taken into custody for driving without a license and 
whose wallet was taken from him by the police.  Would it be reasonable for the police 
officer, because of the possibility that a razor blade was hidden somewhere within the 
wallet, to open it, remove all the contents, and examine each item carefully?  Or 
suppose a lawyer lawfully arrested for a traffic offense is found to have a sealed 
envelope on his person.  Would it be permissible for the arresting officer to tear open 
the envelope in order to make sure that it did not contain a clandestine weapon—
perhaps a pin or a razor blade?  Would it not be more consonant with the purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment and the legitimate needs of the police to require the officer, if 
he has any question whatsoever about what the wallet or letter contains, to hold on to 
it until the arrestee is brought to the precinct station?143
Robinson was decided in 1973, four years before Chadwick and six 
years before Sanders.  In the 1970s, most of the Court’s opinions reflected 
the Warrant Preference view of the Fourth Amendment.
 
144  Even Justice 
Rehnquist, a later proponent of the Separate Clauses view,145
 
140 Id. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority opinion fails to recognize that the 
search conducted by Officer Jenks did not merely involve a search of respondent’s person.  It 
also included a separate search of the effects found on his person.”); see also Bradley, supra 
note 
 acknowledged 
126, at 434 (noting the possibility that the Robinson Court “simply did not consider the 
cigarette package a sufficiently important repository of personal effects” to require a 
warrant). 
141 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
142 Id.  During oral argument, the Government had suggested that it would be 
administratively inconvenient to require a police officer, after removing a container from an 
arrestee’s person, to hold onto the container rather than look inside and determine what it 
contained.  Id. at 259 n.7.  Justice Marshall responded to this argument by admonishing that 
“[m]ere administrative inconvenience . . . cannot justify invasion of Fourth Amendment 
rights.”  Id. 
143 Id. at 257–58 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
144 See Maclin, supra note 16, at 204 (noting that “[t]he warrant preference view grew in 
stature during the latter half of the 1960’s and the early 1970’s”). 
145 See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness.”); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) 
2010] THE DISAPPEARING CONTAINER DOCTRINE 1431 
the existence of a warrant requirement when writing the majority opinion in 
Robinson.  Justice Rehnquist started his analysis by noting, “It is well 
settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”146  However, hints 
that Justice Rehnquist would later see the Fourth Amendment as requiring 
nothing more than reasonableness are also evident in the opinion.  In 
announcing the holding, Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[W]e hold that in the 
case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also 
a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”147
In 1981, the Court extended the scope of a search incident to arrest to 
include the passenger compartment of the car and any containers within 
when the arrestee is an occupant or recent occupant of the vehicle.
 
148  New 
York v. Belton involved the search of a leather jacket found in the backseat 
of a car stopped for speeding.149  When the officer walked up to the car, he 
smelled marijuana and saw an envelope marked “Supergold” on the floor of 
the car, which prompted him to arrest the four men in the car.150
 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is often forgotten that nothing in the Fourth Amendment 
requires that searches be conducted pursuant to warrants.”); see also Thomas Y. Davies, 
Denying a Right By Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, 
Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police 
Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (noting that instead of understanding Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness as substantively satisfied by probable cause and warrants, “[t]he 
Rehnquist Court . . . tends to read the reasonableness requirement in such a loose and 
formless way that enforcement of the right announced in the Fourth Amendment is greatly 
diminished”); Maclin, supra note 
  After 
searching each of the four men, the officer searched the passenger 
compartment of the car where he found a black leather jacket belonging to 
16, at 205 (“After he was appointed to the Court, then 
Justice Rehnquist followed Justice White’s lead by arguing that the Fourth Amendment only 
required that police intrusions be reasonable.”). 
146 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added). 
147 Id. at 235. 
148 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).  Belton was substantially undermined 
in 2009 when the Court decided Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (holding that 
incident to the lawful arrest of the occupant of a car, an officer may search the passenger 
compartment of the car if: (1) the passenger compartment is within the arrestee’s reaching 
distance at the time of the search, or (2) the officer has reason to believe there is evidence 
regarding the crime of arrest in the car).  Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in 
Gant, claimed the Court was not overruling Belton, but it is clear that the government can no 
longer argue that anytime an occupant of a vehicle is lawfully arrested, the officer can search 
the passenger compartment of the car regardless of whether it is within the arrestee’s 
wingspan. 
149 453 U.S. at 455–56. 
150 Id. 
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Belton.151  The officer unzipped one of the pockets and found cocaine 
within.152
In analyzing whether the search of Belton’s leather jacket violated the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court started by endorsing the Warrant Preference 
view of the Fourth Amendment: 
 
It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not 
conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable 
cause to do so.  This Court has recognized, however, that “the exigencies of the 
situation” may sometimes make exemption from the warrant requirement 
“imperative.”153
The Court then opined that the search of Belton’s jacket fell within the 
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, reasoning 
that when the occupant of a vehicle is arrested, the passenger compartment 
is generally within the arrestee’s grabbing distance or wingspan.
 
154
Unlike the Robinson Court, which ignored the fact that the case 
involved a container search, the Belton Court explicitly acknowledged that 
it was dealing with a warrantless search of a container:  “It follows from 
this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any 
containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger 
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be 
within his reach.”
 
155  The Court even provided a definition for the term 
“container”: “‘Container’ here denotes any object capable of holding 
another object.  It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, 
consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger 
compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.”156
 
151 Id. at 456. 
 
152 Id. at 456. 
153 Id. at 457 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 333 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). 
154 Id. at 460 (“Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside 
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact 
generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in order 
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’” (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969))). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 460 n.4.  While the Belton Court was careful to define what it meant by the 
word “container,” it did not explicitly address whether an officer could search a locked 
container found within the passenger compartment incident to an arrest.  Arnold H. Loewy, 
Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 535, 551 (2002) 
(noting that the question of whether a lawful warrantless search of the passenger 
compartment incident to arrest includes locked containers remains open).  Most lower courts 
confronted with this question have held that an officer may search a locked container in the 
passenger compartment of a car incident to the arrest of an occupant of the car, interpreting 
the language in Belton that referred to closed or open receptacles within the passenger 
compartment as broadly allowing a search of any container, locked or unlocked, found in the 
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Despite the officer safety and preservation of evidence rationales 
behind the search incident to arrest exception, the Belton Court, like the 
Robinson Court, seemed unconcerned with whether there was actually any 
danger that Belton or his companions could have gained access to a weapon 
or evidence in the zippered pocket of Belton’s leather jacket.157  The Court 
explained that the need for clear, bright-line rules to guide police officers in 
the field justified dispensing with a case-by-case consideration of whether 
these justifications were actually present in cases involving searches of the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest.158
In 2009, the Court reversed course, holding in Arizona v. Gant that 
police officers may not search the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest unless the arrestee is actually 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 





car’s interior.  See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 512 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Howe, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184–85 (D. Utah 2003) (“The Court finds the search 
of the locked briefcase analogous to the search of a locked glove compartment, which 
several circuits have found permissible.”); State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565, 576 (Wis. 1986) 
(“We conclude that all closed containers, locked or unlocked, in an automobile which may 
be searched incident to an arrest can be searched.”).  A few courts, in contrast, have held that 
an officer may not search a locked container found in the passenger compartment of a car 
incident to arrest, noting that the contents of a locked container generally are not readily 
accessible to the arrestee and that by locking the container, the arrestee has manifested a 
heightened expectation of privacy.  See, e.g., State v. Jones, 45 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Wash. 
2002) (“[L]ocked containers within a vehicle may not be searched incident to an occupant’s 
arrest.”); State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (Wash. 1986) (holding that the Washington state 
constitution requires an officer conducting a search incident to arrest to obtain a warrant 
before unlocking and searching a locked container found in the passenger compartment of a 
car). 
  Requiring the arrestee to be within reaching distance of 
the passenger compartment at the time of the search reflects a return to the 
original justifications behind the search incident to arrest doctrine—
justifications grounded in officer safety and evidence preservation concerns.  
Allowing the officer to search the passenger compartment if he has reason 
to believe it contains evidence related to the crime of arrest was a 
concession to Justice Scalia who had proposed such a rule in his 
concurrence in Thornton v. United States, an earlier case which held that the 
157 453 U.S. at 458. 
158 Id.  For a critique of the Court’s embrace of bright-line rules, see Alschuler, supra 
note 37; Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: 
Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 393–95 
(2004) (arguing that the desire for determinacy has led the Court to embrace bright-line rules 
that have the unintended consequence of undermining the legitimacy of police search 
power). 
159 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
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rule of Belton applies even when the officer initiates contact with the 
arrestee after the arrestee has exited the vehicle.160
Focusing on reasonableness, the State argued that searches incident to 
arrest of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle are reasonable even 
in cases where the arrestee is not actually able to access the passenger 
compartment because law enforcement interests, particularly the interest in 
bright-line rules, outweigh the arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his 
vehicle.
 
161  The Court rejected this argument, accusing the State of 
“seriously undervalu[ing] the privacy interests at stake.”162
 
160 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).  In Thornton, Justice Scalia proposed 
a rule that would enable an officer to engage in a search incident to arrest of the vehicle 
whenever he has reason to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in 
the car.  Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The majority opinion in Arizona v. Gant thus 
reflects a marriage of convenience.  Three of the Justices (Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) 
probably would have been happy with a rule limiting Belton searches to cases where the 
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, 
but in order to get Justices Scalia and Thomas on board, they adopted Justice Scalia’s 
proposal allowing an officer to search the passenger compartment incident to arrest when the 
officer has reason to believe there is evidence relating to the crime of arrest in the vehicle. 
  The Court 
 By incorporating Justice Scalia’s proposal, the Court may have unwittingly opened the 
door to future erosion of motorists’ privacy interests.  While prong one of the new Gant test 
(allowing warrantless searches of the passenger compartment if the arrestee is actually 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search) arguably 
makes it more difficult for officers to search vehicles incident to arrest, prong two (allowing 
a warrantless search of the passenger compartment if the officer has reason to believe the 
vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest) arguably makes it easier because it allows 
an officer to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle practically any time the 
occupant is arrested for a crime other than a traffic violation.  James J. Tomkovicz, Divining 
and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, 
Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1470 (arguing that “[a]n endorsement 
of [Justice Scalia’s] evidence-gathering theory for searches incident to arrest would likely 
expand officers’ authority to conduct searches incident to arrest whenever an offense is of a 
sort that ‘might’ entail evidence or contraband”).  Moreover, if an officer has reason to 
believe there is evidence of the crime of arrest somewhere in the vehicle, there is no 
principled reason to restrict the search to the passenger compartment.  The reason Belton 
restricted the search incident to arrest to the passenger compartment was because the Court 
felt the passenger compartment was generally within the recent occupant’s grabbing 
distance.  A closed trunk, in contrast, is not.  If the reason for allowing the search is because 
the officer has reason to believe evidence of a crime is in the vehicle, it does not make sense 
to restrict the search to the passenger compartment.  Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1731 (Alito, J., 
dissenting).  In his dissent, Justice Alito noted that it was unclear why the court used the 
standard “reason to believe” rather than probable cause, suggesting that “reason to believe” 
is a lower standard than probable cause.  Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).  This interpretation makes 
sense because if an officer has probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is in the 
vehicle, then he can engage in a warrantless search of the vehicle under the automobile 
exception.  
161 Id. at 1720. 
162 Id. 
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explained that even though “a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is 
less substantial than in his home, the former interest is nevertheless 
deserving of constitutional protection.”163
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens, then the oldest member of the 
Court, grounded the majority opinion in the Warrant Preference view of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Justice Stevens noted: 
 
Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every case 
addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that 
“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”164
Acknowledging that Belton had “been widely understood [as allowing] a 
vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there [was] 
no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the 
search,”
   
165 Justice Stevens noted that this broad reading of Belton had the 
undesired effect of untethering the Belton rule from the original 
justifications underlying the search incident to arrest exception.166 
Moreover, Justice Stevens noted that Belton was based on the faulty 
assumption that articles within the passenger compartment are generally 
within the arrestee’s grabbing distance when the arrestee is an occupant or 
recent occupant of the vehicle.  He concluded, “We now know that articles 
inside the passenger compartment are rarely ‘within the area within which 
an arrestee might reach.’”167
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito accused the majority of 
overruling Belton without saying so.
 
168  Somewhat disingenuously, Justice 
Stevens denied that the Court was overruling Belton,169 claiming it was 
simply rejecting a popular but erroneous reading of Belton.170  To justify the 
different results in the two cases, Justice Stevens distinguished the facts in 
Gant from the facts in Belton.  He pointed out that in Belton, a single officer 
was dealing with four unsecured arrestees.171
 
163 Id. 
  In Gant, in contrast, there 
were five officers and only three arrestees, all of whom had been 
handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched 
164 Gant, 129 S. Ct.  at 1716 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).  
165 Id. at 1718. 
166 Id. at 1719. 
167 Id. at 1723 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)). 
168 Id. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. at 1722 n.9. 
170 Id. at 1722–23. 
171 Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56. 
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Gant’s car.172  In Belton, given the number of arrestees and the fact that they 
were not handcuffed or secured in the back of a locked patrol car, it was 
possible that one or more of the four arrestees could have rushed the car, 
overpowered the one officer, and gained access to weapons or evidence in 
the car.  In Gant, it was highly unlikely that the handcuffed arrestees who 
were locked in the back of separate patrol cars could have harmed any of 
the officers or accessed evidence in the car.  Another key difference 
between the two cases involved the offense of arrest.  The arrestees in 
Belton were arrested for drug offenses and the arresting officer had reason 
to believe there were drugs in the car because he smelled marijuana and saw 
an envelope with the label “Supergold” when he walked up to the car.173  In 
Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license and 
there was no reason to believe evidence of this crime would be found in his 
car.174
While Gant changes what is required to justify the search of a vehicle 
incident to arrest of an occupant or recent occupant of the vehicle,
 
175 it does 
not change the scope of what may be searched.  Belton is still good law 
insofar as it defines the permissible scope of a search of a vehicle incident 
to arrest.  Incident to a lawful custodial arrest of a recent occupant of the 
vehicle, an officer can still only search the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle, not the trunk.176
The search incident to arrest exception thus allows an officer who has 
executed a valid custodial arrest to conduct a warrantless search of (1) 
containers found on the person of the arrestee,
  Moreover, Gant did not modify the Belton 
definition of a container. 
177 (2) containers within the 
arrestee’s wingspan,178
 
172 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
 and (3) if the arrestee is an occupant or recent 
occupant of the car, containers in the passenger compartment of the car if 
the passenger compartment is within the arrestee’s reaching distance at the 
time of the search or the officer has reason to believe there is evidence 
173 Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56. 
174 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
175 Under the prior interpretation of Belton, all that was needed to search the passenger 
compartment of a car was a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant or recent occupant of a 
vehicle.  Under the current reading of Belton, in addition to a lawful custodial arrest, the 
arrestee must be within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search or the officer must have reason to believe evidence of the crime of arrest is in the 
vehicle.  See Gant, 123 S. Ct. at 1723. 
176 Id. at 1720 (“Belton searches authorize police officers to search not just the passenger 
compartment but every purse, briefcase, or other container within that space.”). 
177 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
178 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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regarding the crime of arrest in the car.179
B. SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION 
  The officer need not demonstrate 
that he had probable cause to believe the container being searched 
contained contraband or evidence of a crime. 
The most significant incursions on the Container Doctrine have 
occurred in the context of container searches in automobiles.  Not only can 
police officers search containers in the passenger compartment of a car 
incident to a lawful custodial arrest under the circumstances described 
above, but under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, 
police may also search any part of a motor vehicle, including containers 
within, as long as they have probable cause to believe contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found within the vehicle.180  Probable cause is 
the only requirement for a valid automobile exception search.181  It is not 
necessary for the government to show exigent circumstances or that it 
would have been impracticable to obtain a warrant in advance.182
Warrantless searches of automobiles under the automobile exception 
are allowed for two reasons.  First, the ready mobility of a motor vehicle 
makes it impracticable for law enforcement officers to secure a search 
warrant.
 
183  Second, individuals supposedly have diminished expectations 
of privacy in motor vehicles because motor vehicles are subject to pervasive 
governmental regulation.184
Before 1991, whether police needed a warrant to search a container 
found in a car depended on whether the officer had probable cause to 
 
 
179 Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
180 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).  For an excellent critique of the 
automobile exception, see Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise 
of a Public Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375 
(1986) (arguing that the automobile exception has become a public place exception, 
eliminating the warrant requirement for effects found in public places). 
181 Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (holding that probable cause alone 
satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment). 
182 Id. at 466–67 (“[U]nder our established precedent, the ‘automobile exception’ has no 
separate exigency requirement.”). 
183 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1985). 
184 Id. at 391.  Those who drive frequently may disagree with the Court’s assumption that 
individuals have diminished expectations of privacy in their cars.  At least eighty-four 
million Americans drive to work alone in their cars each day.  See David A. Harris, Car 
Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 576 
(1998) (noting that “[d]espite the congestion, expense, and environmental damage caused by 
cars, most Americans go to work in private vehicles” and “more than eighty-four million 
drive to work alone” while “another fifteen million travel in car pools”).  These drivers do 
not expect government officials to inspect the contents of their vehicles, even though they 
may be subject to annual inspections for safety and emissions purposes. 
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believe there was evidence of a crime somewhere within the vehicle or in a 
container in the vehicle.185  In United States v. Ross, the Court held that if a 
police officer had probable cause to believe there was contraband or 
evidence of a crime somewhere in a vehicle, he could search every part of 
the vehicle, including containers that could hold the object of the search.186  
In contrast, if the officer had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime 
would be found in a container and nowhere else in the car, then the officer 
had to get a warrant in order to search that container.187
Adhering to the Warrant Preference view, the Ross Court noted that 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”
  In other words, if 
the officer had probable cause as to the car in general, i.e., a reasonable 
belief that there was contraband or evidence of a crime somewhere within 
the car, the automobile exception applied, and the officer did not need a 
warrant to search the car.  If, on the other hand, the officer had probable 
cause specific to a container in the car, i.e., a reasonable belief that 
contraband or evidence of a crime was inside a container that happened to 
be in the car, then the Container Doctrine applied, and the officer had to 
obtain a warrant to search the container. 
188
In California v. Acevedo, the Court abandoned the careful distinction 
drawn in Ross between permissible and impermissible searches of 
containers in cars.
  The Ross 
Court reaffirmed Sanders and the Container Doctrine as it applied to 
containers in cars. 
189
 
185 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
  While proclaiming fidelity to the Warrant Preference 
186 Id. at 825.  The Ross Court was careful to note that it was not overruling Arkansas v. 
Sanders.  Id. at 824. 
187 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991) (explaining that under Ross, the 
Carroll doctrine covered searches of automobiles where the police had probable cause to 
search an entire vehicle, but Chadwick governed if the officer had probable cause to search 
only a container within a vehicle); see also Bradley, supra note 126, at 438 (noting that until 
Acevedo, “if police had probable cause only to search a suitcase or other container found in 
an automobile, they had to obtain a search warrant before opening the container,” but “if 
they had probable cause to search the automobile generally, then they could search it fully, 
including opening any containers found therein”); Katz, supra note 21, at 417 (noting that by 
not overruling Sanders, the Ross Court left intact the rule that police “may not rely upon the 
broad warrant exemption for automobiles to search containers found in a vehicle when the 
probable cause focused upon the container prior to being place in the automobile”). 
188 Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 327 (1967)).  
189 500 U.S. at 565. 
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view,190 the Acevedo Court essentially eliminated the warrant requirement 
for containers in cars, holding that a warrant is not necessary to search a 
container in a car as long as police officers have probable cause to believe 
evidence of a crime will be found in that container.191  The Court justified 
this holding by finding that such searches fell within the automobile 
exception, an exception that was “specifically established and well 
delineated.”192
The Court provided three rationales for its new rule.  First, the Court 
opined that the Ross rule encouraged broader searches than the rule it 
announced.
 
193  Under Ross, police officers wishing to search a container in 
a car without getting a warrant needed probable cause to search the entire 
car.194  To establish such broad probable cause, the Acevedo Court opined, 
police would be tempted to search the entire car rather than just the 
container.195
The problem with this argument is that police cannot manufacture 
probable cause to search a car by searching the entire car.  Whether or not 
an officer has probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found 
somewhere in the car must be determined on the basis of the facts known to 
the officer prior to the search.  If the facts and circumstances known to the 
officer before the search would have led him to believe evidence of a crime 
could only be found in a container in a car, then a search of the entire car 
will not change those facts and circumstances.  Under Ross, the officer 
under such circumstances would only be allowed to search the container, 
not the entire car. 
 
Second, the Acevedo Court expressed doubt as to whether the 
Container Doctrine substantially protects privacy interests.196
 
190 Id. at 580 (noting that it “remains a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions”) (internal quotations omitted). 
  If the police 
have probable cause to seize a container, the Court reasoned, a search 
191 Id. at 579. 
192 Id. at 580. 
193 Id. at 574 (“The line between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to 
search a package in that vehicle is not always clear, and separate rules that govern the two 
objects to be searched may enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless 
searches . . . .”). 
194 United State v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).  
195 500 U.S. at 574–75 (“If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are 
actually searching the entire car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise 
would in order to establish the general probable cause required by Ross.”). 
196 Id. at 575 (“To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders rule protects privacy, its 
protection is minimal.”). 
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warrant will generally be forthcoming.197
The problem with this argument is that it completely disregards the 
reason why warrants are usually required in the first instance.  We want the 
probable cause determination to be made by a neutral and detached judicial 
officer, not someone who is in the business of enforcing the law.  While the 
police officer’s conclusion that there is probable cause to search may often 
be correct, it is also possible that a judicial officer will disagree with the 
officer’s assessment of the situation.  To say that we should dispense with 
the warrant requirement because the officer has already decided there is 
probable cause, and a warrant is therefore likely to be forthcoming, is to 
miss this critical point. 
  In other words, a judicial 
magistrate will likely agree with the officer’s assessment of probable cause 
and issue a warrant. 
Third, the Acevedo Court stressed the need for a bright-line rule to 
guide law enforcement officers in the field.198  The Court felt the 
discrepancy between the Carroll doctrine (the automobile exception) and 
the Chadwick-Sanders rule (the Container Doctrine) had confused law 
enforcement, and the rule it was announcing would be easier for police 
officers in the field to apply.199  The problem with this rationale is that the 
administrative convenience that bright-line rules provide to police should 
not trump the constitutional rights of individual citizens.200  In the words of 
Justice Brennan, “[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more 
efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.”201
In a harsh critique of the Container Doctrine, the Acevedo Court noted, 
“The Chadwick-Sanders rule not only has failed to protect privacy but also 





197 Id. (“Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, we 
can assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of 
cases.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
  The Court then explicitly overruled Sanders and 
established the rule that governs containers in cars today: if police have 
probable cause to believe that evidence of crime is inside a container that 
198 Id. at 579 (“We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern 
automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in 
Sanders.”). 
199 Id. at 577 (“The discrepancy between the two rules has led to confusion for law 
enforcement officers.”). 
200 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 258 n.7 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]dministrative inconvenience . . . cannot justify invasion of Fourth Amendment 
rights . . . .”). 
201 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)). 
202 500 U.S. at 576. 
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happens to be in a car, they can search that container without a warrant.203  
If police have probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is 
somewhere inside a vehicle, they can search anywhere within the vehicle, 
including any and all containers in the vehicle, that might hold the object of 
the search.204  If probable cause is limited to the container, police can search 
the container but cannot search anywhere else in the vehicle.205
While critical of the Container Doctrine, the Acevedo Court did not 
eliminate it completely.  Police still need a warrant to search a container 
found on the street, as opposed to one found in a motor vehicle.
   
206  Justice 
Scalia noted that this created an anomaly.207  If police have probable cause 
to believe there is evidence of a crime in a container carried by a person on 
the street and do not have probable cause to arrest that person, they cannot 
search the container unless they get a warrant.208  If the person puts that 
container in a car, then all of a sudden police can search the very same 
container without a warrant.209  Indeed, in Acevedo, the police waited until 
Acevedo placed the paper bag that they believed contained drugs into the 
trunk of his car before attempting to search it,210 presumably because the 
police knew they would need a warrant if they seized the bag on the 
street.211
In Wyoming v. Houghton, the Court further reduced protections for 
containers in cars when it held that probable cause to believe that the driver 
of a vehicle has illegal drugs in the car gives the police the authority to 
conduct a warrantless search of a passenger’s purse found on the backseat 
floor of the passenger compartment, even if the police have no 




203 Id. at 580. 
  
Writing for the Houghton Court in 1999, Justice Scalia did not even pay lip 
204 Id. (“The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they 
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”). 
205 Id. 
206 See Bradley, supra note 126, at 439 (“If such a suitcase or briefcase is not found in a 
vehicle, Acevedo suggests that Chadwick will still apply.”). 
207 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 584 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
208 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
209 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
210 Id. at 567. 
211 This inconsistency between the no warrant required rule for containers in automobiles 
and the warrant requirement rule for containers on the street created by the Acevedo decision 
prompted one scholar, James Tomkovicz, to predict the imminent demise of the Container 
Doctrine.  Tomkovicz, supra note 20, at 1115 (“At the very least, the Court is poised to 
abandon Chadwick and to exempt all searches outside of private buildings from the rule that 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.”). 
212 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
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service to the Warrant Preference view, quoting only the first part of the 
Fourth Amendment: “The Fourth Amendment protects ‘the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.’”213  Justice Scalia then gave a plug to 
what David Sklansky has called the Court’s new Fourth Amendment 
originalism:214
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this provision, we 
inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under 
the common law when the Amendment was framed.  Where that inquiry yields no 
answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of 
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
 
215
Looking to early common law history, Justice Scalia found that the 
search of Houghton’s purse was lawful because customs officials in the 
eighteenth century had the right to search containers on ships and vessels 
without a warrant.  Notwithstanding the fact that there is a big difference 
between a ship that carries many passengers and their cargo and a car that is 
owned and operated by a single individual for that individual’s personal 
use, Justice Scalia explained: 
 
[T]he Framers would have regarded such a search as reasonable in light of legislation 
enacted by Congress from 1789 through 1799—as well as subsequent legislation from 
the founding era and beyond—that empowered customs officials to search any ship or 
vessel without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it contained goods 
subject to a duty . . . .  During virtually the entire history of our country—whether 
contraband was transported in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern 
automobile—it has been assumed that a lawful search of the vehicle would include a 
search of any container that might conceal the object of the search.216
Justice Scalia concluded that if an officer has probable cause to search 
a car, he can examine any and all containers within the car that might hold 
the object of the search without needing a particularized showing of 




213 Id. at 299. 
  Under this reasoning, the warrantless 
search of Houghton’s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment even 
214 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1739, 1760 (2000) (“The full Court had hinted at sympathy for Scalia’s new Fourth 
Amendment originalism in Wilson v. Arkansas, and finally embraced it in Wyoming v. 
Houghton.”). 
215 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299–300. 
216 Id. at 300–01. 
217 Id. at 302 (“When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is 
reasonable for police officers—like customs officials in the founding era—to examine 
packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.”). 
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though the officer had no reason to suspect the passenger was hiding drugs 
or contraband in her purse. 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia drew a distinction between searches of 
passengers (searches of the person) and searches of property belonging to 
passengers, suggesting that the heightened expectations of privacy that 
attend to one’s person do not attend to one’s property and that a warrant 
might be required for a search of a passenger’s person.218  Justice Breyer, 
concurring in Houghton, went further and opined that property found on a 
passenger’s person, such as a wallet in a male passenger’s pants pocket or a 
purse carried by a female passenger, should be treated differently than 
property found at a distance from the passenger.219  Justice Breyer viewed 
the search of a wallet or a purse carried by a passenger as a search of the 
person, rather than as merely a search of property.220
In sum, under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an 
officer with probable cause to believe there is contraband or evidence of a 
crime within a motor vehicle
  As of the writing of 
this Article, the full Court has not yet decided whether a warrant is required 
for the search of a container found on the person of the passenger when the 
officer has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband or 
evidence of a crime incriminating the driver, but no probable cause specific 
to the container. 
221 may search that vehicle and any containers 
within that could contain the object of the search.222  Without any further 
justification, the officer can even search a container belonging to a 
passenger that is not directly on the passenger’s person as long as the object 
of the search might be hidden in that container.223  If the probable cause is 
specific to a container in a car, the officer can search the container without a 
warrant but may not search anywhere else in the car.224
 
218 Id. at 303 (distinguishing the instant case from United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 
(1948) and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) on the ground that those two cases 
involved searches of persons whereas this case involved a search of property). 
 
219 Id. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“But I can say that it would matter if a woman’s 
purse, like a man’s billfold, were attached to her person.  It might then amount to a kind of 
‘outer clothing’ . . . .  In this case, the purse was separate from the person . . . .”). 
220 Id. 
221 The Court has held that a motor home parked on a public street is a motor vehicle for 
purposes of the automobile exception.  California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1985). 
222 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may search an 
automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe 
contraband or evidence is contained.”). 
223 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302. 
224 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579–80. 
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C. CONSENT SEARCHES 
Another way police can search a container without a warrant despite 
the Container Doctrine is by obtaining consent to search the general area 
where the container is found.  Consent to search a car has been construed by 
the Supreme Court to include consent to search unlocked containers within 
the car that could hold the object of the search.225  A consent search is valid 
as long as the consent is given voluntarily.226  It is not necessary for the 
officer to tell the individual of his or her right to refuse consent.227
In Florida v. Jimeno, the Court established the reasonable person test 
used today for determining the scope of an individual’s consent to search.
 
228  
The Court also made it easier for a police officer who obtains consent to 
search a car to search a container within the car even when the owner of the 
car does not explicitly consent to a search of the container.229
In Florida v. Jimeno, an officer overheard the defendant, Enio Jimeno, 
arrange “what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone.”
 
230  
When Jimeno drove away, the officer followed.  After seeing Jimeno turn 
right on red without stopping, the officer pulled Jimeno over to issue a 
traffic citation.231
 
225 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251–52 (1991). 
  The officer told Jimeno that he was being stopped for 
226 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). 
227 Id. at 231.  For an excellent critique of the Court’s consent jurisprudence and an 
argument that consent searches should be completely banned, see Marcy Strauss, 
Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2002).  See also Tracey 
Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 27 (2008) (arguing that whenever a person refuses to provide consent, 
that refusal should bar further attempts by the police to seek consent); Janice Nadler, No 
Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153 
(applying insights from social psychology to the question of whether one can voluntarily 
consent to a search requested by a police officer); Dana Raigrodski, Consent Engendered: A 
Feminist Critique of Consensual Fourth Amendment Searches, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
37 (2004) (arguing that the consent doctrine is flawed because the Court constructs the 
notion of consent from a male perspective); Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim: ‘Consent’ 
Within the Fourth Amendment and Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 
(2010) (applying insights from the feminist critique of rape law to the doctrine of consent in 
the Fourth Amendment arena); Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The 
Contradictory Role of Consent in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (using political theory to challenge the Court’s broad interpretation of 
the concept of consent in the search, confession, and plea contexts) (manuscript at 1) (on file 
with author). 
228 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.  The test asks what the typical reasonable person would have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.  Id. 
229 Id. at 252 (stating that reasonableness does not require police officers to “separately 
request permission to search each container”). 
230 Id. at 249. 
231 Id. 
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committing a traffic violation and that he had reason to believe Jimeno was 
carrying narcotics, and then asked for permission to search Jimeno’s car.232  
Jimeno told the officer he had nothing to hide and gave the officer 
permission to search the car.233  The officer saw a brown paper bag on the 
floorboard of the car, opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine within.234
Jimeno was charged with possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine.
 
235  Before trial, he moved to suppress the cocaine found inside the 
paper bag on the ground that his “consent to search the car did not extend to 
the closed paper bag inside of the car.”236  The trial court granted the 
motion to suppress, finding that the defendant’s consent to search the car 
did not include consent to search the paper bag inside the car.237  The 
Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that “consent to a 
general search for narcotics does not extend to sealed containers within the 
general area agreed to by the defendant.”238  The Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed.239
Writing for the Court in 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist began his 
analysis by embracing the Separate Clauses view of the Fourth 
Amendment, opining that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.”
 
240  He continued by stating, “The Fourth Amendment does 
not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes 
those which are unreasonable.”241
With this focus on reasonableness, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained 
that a court trying to measure the scope of a suspect’s consent should apply 
an objective reasonableness standard and ask: “what would the typical 






  Despite the fact that all three of the Florida courts that had 
considered Jimeno’s motion to suppress found that Jimeno’s consent to 
search the car did not mean he was giving consent to search the paper bag 
inside the car, the Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Florida on the ground that a reasonable person would have understood the 
exchange between the officer and Jimeno to mean that Jimeno had 
233 Id. at 249–50. 




238 State v. Jimeno, 550 So. 2d 1176, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
239 State v. Jimeno, 564 So. 2d 1083 (1990).  
240 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 251. 
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consented to a search of the paper bag.243  Justice Rehnquist explained that 
in light of the fact that the officer had informed Jimeno that he believed 
Jimeno was carrying drugs, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to 
conclude that Jimeno’s general consent to search the car included his 
specific consent to search any containers within the car that might contain 
drugs.244  Justice Rehnquist further noted that “[a] reasonable person may 
be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of 
container,” not “strewn across the trunk or floor of the car.”245
In his dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that “[b]y the same logic a 
person who consents to a search of the car . . . could also be deemed to 
consent to a search of his person or indeed of his body cavities, since a 
reasonable person may be expected to know that drug couriers frequently 
store their contraband on their persons or in their body cavities,”
 
246 yet a 
reasonable person would probably understand that a person who consents to 
a search of his car for drugs does not consent to a search of his person for 
drugs.247  Justice Marshall reminded the Court that just as individuals have 
heightened expectations of privacy in their persons, they have heightened 
expectations of privacy in their containers.248
In an interesting departure from previous Court statements about 
whether the Court should draw a distinction between locked and unlocked 
containers,
 
249 Justice Rehnquist suggested that a locked briefcase might be 
treated differently than a closed paper bag, writing, “It is very likely 
unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his 
trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the 
trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.”250
Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion that a locked briefcase is entitled to 
more protection than a closed paper bag was contrary to previous 
  While 
Justice Rehnquist did not explain why he thought it would be unreasonable 
to think that consent to search a car would include consent to search a 
locked container within the car, one obvious reason is the heightened 
expectation of privacy one presumably has in the contents of a container 
that one has gone to the trouble of locking. 
 
243 Id. at 250–51. 
244 Id. at 251.  
245 Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982)). 
246 Id. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 253. 
249 See Ross, 456 U.S. 822 (noting that the Court was in unanimous agreement in 
Robbins v. California that a constitutional distinction between “worthy” and “unworthy” 
containers would be improper). 
250 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251–52. 
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pronouncements by the Court on this issue.  As Justice Marshall pointed out 
in his dissent, the Court “has soundly rejected any distinction between 
‘worthy’ containers, like locked briefcases, and ‘unworthy’ containers, like 
paper bags.”251
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same 
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who 
carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim 
an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated 
executive with the locked attaché case.
  Quoting from United States v. Ross, Justice Marshall noted: 
252
Florida v. Jimeno establishes that when an officer specifies what he is 
looking for, consent to search one’s car includes consent to search unlocked 
containers within the car that could be concealing the object of the 
search.
 
253  At least one state court has held that when an officer at a safety 
roadblock fails to specify the object of his search, an individual’s 
unrestricted consent to search his car does not extend to containers within 
the car.254  Accordingly, a person who consents to a police search of his car 
for drugs consents to letting the officer search unlocked containers within 
the car that might contain drugs.255
D. THE TERRY STOP AND FRISK DOCTRINE 
 
1. Terry v. Ohio’s Embrace of the Separate Clauses/Reasonableness 
Approach 
The Terry stop and frisk doctrine provides another avenue for 
warrantless searches of containers carried by persons on the street.256  
Although the Terry decision did not involve a container search, subsequent 
cases have extended Terry to cover such searches.257
 
251 Id. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
  In Terry v. Ohio, the 
Court held that an officer can stop, i.e., briefly detain, an individual based 
upon a particularized suspicion, later deemed “reasonable suspicion,” of 
252 Id. (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 822). 
253 Id. at 251. 
254 See State v. Sargent, 984 A.2d 831, 834–35 (Me. 2009). 
255 While Jimeno involved consent to search a car, one can see how the reasoning of 
Jimeno could be extended to the home such that a homeowner’s consent to search a home 
could be construed to include consent to search any unlocked containers in the home that 
might contain the object of the search. 
256 For enlightening discussion and critique of the Terry stop and frisk doctrine, see 
Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423 (2004); 
Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality 
Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual 
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 NYU L. REV. 956 (1999). 
257 See infra text accompanying notes 271–291. 
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criminal activity.258  Furthermore, if the officer can point to specific and 
articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that the individual stopped 
is armed and dangerous, the officer can conduct a limited pat-down frisk of 
the individual to make sure he cannot access a weapon that he could use 
against the officer.259  The sole purpose of a Terry frisk must be to look for 
weapons, not contraband or evidence of a crime.260
The Terry decision, written in 1968—before the Court established the 
Container Doctrine—signaled the Court’s early willingness to view the two 
clauses of the Fourth Amendment as separate and independent, rather than 
interconnected, clauses.  Writing for a nearly unanimous court, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren quoted the words of the Fourth Amendment,
 
261 then 
noted, “[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”262  Later in the opinion, he remarked 
that “the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental 
invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”263





258 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1968).  As Lewis Katz notes, “Chief Justice 
Warren’s majority opinion [in Terry v. Ohio] never used the term ‘reasonable suspicion,’ 
instead writing of ‘unusual conduct’ which leads a police officer ‘reasonably to conclude in 
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.’”  Katz, supra note 
  It sought to explain its adoption of the 
256, at 486 
(“It was only in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Sibron that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
standard was articulated.”) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)). 
259 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in 
this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit 
a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer; where he has reason 
to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether 
he has probable cause to arrest the individual . . . .”).  In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Harlan clarified that the officer must first have the right to stop the individual before he can 
frisk him.  Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he officer must first have constitutional 
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop.”).  If the officer reasonably 
suspects that the person is engaging or has engaged in a crime of violence, the right to frisk 
flows automatically from the right to stop the individual.  Id. at 33 (“[T]he right to frisk must 
be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a 
crime of violence.”). 
260 Id. at 29 (“The sole justification of the search . . . is the protection of the police officer 
and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably 
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the 
police officer.”). 
261 Id. at 8. 
262 Id. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). 
263 Id. at 19. 
264 Id. at 20. 
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Reasonableness view by claiming that the case before it did not involve 
police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment: 
We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain 
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, or 
that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be 
excused by exigent circumstances.  But we deal here with an entire rubric of police 
conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the 
officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could 
not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.  Instead, the conduct involved in this case 
must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.265
The Terry Court’s embrace of the Reasonableness view of the Fourth 
Amendment was a clear departure from precedent.  As Earl C. Dudley, Jr., 
who was one of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s law clerks at the time Terry 
was decided, notes, “[T]he Court had historically read the Fourth 
Amendment’s two clauses in pari materia [i.e., construed together].  The 
Warrant Clause’s standard of ‘probable cause’ had been taken to define the 
‘reasonableness’ of a search and seizure, even where obtaining a warrant 
was excused as impracticable.”
 
266
Surprisingly, it was Justice Brennan, known as one of the most liberal 
Justices on the Court and a staunch defender of the Warrant Preference 
view,
 
267 who first suggested that the two clauses in the Fourth Amendment 
should be read as separate and distinct commands.268
 
265 Id. (citations omitted). 
  Dudley notes that it 
was Justice Brennan who argued that “[i]n a context—swiftly developing 
266 Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 894 (1998). 
267 See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 143 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“The Amendment protects [the interest in privacy and the possessory interest in property] in 
precisely the same manner: by requiring a neutral and detached magistrate to evaluate, 
before the search or seizure, the government’s showing of probable cause and its particular 
description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized.”); United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 552 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Though the 
Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ the definition of 
‘reasonableness’ turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant 
clause.”) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (internal 
quotation omitted); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 774 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“I suppose one should be grateful that the Court has not explicitly opened one more breach 
in the general rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”) (quoting 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)). 
268 Dudley, supra note 266, at 894 (“It was Justice Brennan who suggested, after the 
initial Warren draft had sat for several weeks without collecting any votes, what emerged 
eventually as the doctrinal solution—the analytical separation of the amendment’s two 
clauses.”). 
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street encounters—where obtaining a warrant was inherently 
impracticable . . . the strictures of the Warrant Clause were simply 
inapplicable, and the definition of a ‘reasonable’ search could and should be 
cut free from the standard of ‘probable cause.’”269  Justice Brennan’s 
suggestion was incorporated into the final draft of the Terry opinion, and 
prompted Justice Douglas to dissent.270
2. The Plain Feel Exception Extended to Cover Container Searches 
 
The Container Doctrine has further been eroded by the Court’s 
recognition of a plain feel exception to the warrant requirement.  In 1993, 
the Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson extended the plain view doctrine271 to 
the sense of touch, holding that when an officer conducting a lawful Terry 
frisk feels an object whose incriminating character is immediately apparent 
and the officer has probable cause to believe the object is (or contains) 
contraband or evidence of a crime, the officer may seize that object without 
stopping to get a warrant.272  Under the plain feel exception, evidence may 
be admitted if (1) the officer had a lawful right of access to the item as he 
would if he were conducting a lawful Terry stop,273 (2) the officer had 




 and (3) the incriminating nature of the item was immediately 
270 Id. at 895. 
271 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323, 326–27 (1987) (explaining the plain view 
doctrine). 
272 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993).  In Dickerson, two police 
officers were patrolling a neighborhood at night in a marked police car.  They saw a man 
leaving an apartment building known to the officers as a crack house.  The man began 
walking towards the officers, but upon seeing the squad car and making eye contact with one 
of the officers, abruptly halted and began walking in the opposite direction.  Based on the 
man’s evasive actions and the fact that he had just left a building known for cocaine 
trafficking, the officers decided to stop and frisk the man.  During the frisk, one officer felt a 
lump in the man’s front pocket.  After squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the 
contents of the man’s pocket with his fingers, the officer determined that the lump was crack 
cocaine wrapped in cellophane.  The officer reached into the defendant’s pocket and pulled 
out a small plastic bag containing a fifth of a gram of crack cocaine.  The defendant was 
arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance.  Before trial, the defendant 
moved to suppress the drugs found during the pat-down frisk.  Id. at 368–69. 
273 Id. at 375 (“If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels 
an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no 
invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for 
weapons . . . .”). 
274 Id. at 376 (“Regardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or by 
touch, however, the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the officer have probable cause to 
believe that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative 
seizures.”). 
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apparent to the officer.275  Because the officer in Dickerson had to squeeze 
and manipulate the lump in order to determine that it was a baggy filled 
with cocaine, the incriminating character of the object in this case was not 
immediately apparent to the officer, and the seizure of the cocaine was 
deemed unconstitutional.276
Ironically, the Dickerson Court endorsed the Warrant Preference view 
of the Fourth Amendment, noting “[t]ime and again, this Court has 
observed that searches and seizures ‘conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
established and well delineated exceptions.’”
 
277  Even though the search at 
issue did not fall within a specifically established and well-delineated 
exception, the Court created a new exception to the warrant requirement—
the plain feel exception—then found that the search in question failed to 
meet the requirements of this new exception.278
Although Dickerson spoke only to the lawfulness of the seizure of an 
object found during a lawful Terry frisk, lower courts have relied upon 
Dickerson to permit searches as well as seizures of containers found on a 
suspect during a lawful Terry frisk.
 
279  For example, in Ball v. United 
States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that drugs found in a 
large medicine bottle during the course of a lawful Terry frisk were 
admissible under the plain feel doctrine even though touching alone could 
not have revealed the presence of contraband inside the medicine bottle.280
Ball was a passenger in a vehicle stopped because it lacked a front 
license plate.
 
281  The officer who stopped the car noticed that Ball kept 
reaching toward his jacket’s center pocket even though the officer kept 
telling him not to do so.282
 
275 Id. at 379 (“Although the officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in 
respondent’s pocket, because Terry entitled him to place his hands upon respondent’s jacket, 
the court below determined that the incriminating character of the object was not 
immediately apparent to him.”). 
  When Ball reached for his jacket pocket for a 
third time, the officer decided to frisk him.  During the frisk, the officer 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 372 (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1984)) (internal 
quotes omitted). 
278 Id. at 375. 
279 See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 129 F.3d 76, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76, 377, 378 (1993)) (affirming district court’s 
ruling that admission of cocaine found in paper bag removed from defendant during a pat-
down frisk was proper). 
280 Ball v. United States, 803 A.2d 971, 982 (D.C. 2002). 
281 Id. at 973. 
282 Id. 
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“felt a large cylinder container which [he] thought to be a large medicine 
bottle.”283  The officer testified that he immediately thought “it was some 
kind of contraband or narcotics because [Ball had] made several attempts to 
go into his pocket and remove it.”284  The officer removed the medicine 
bottle from Ball’s pocket, opened it, and found a number of Ziploc bags 
containing a white rock-like substance, which turned out to be drugs.285
Ball was charged with unlawful possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance.
 
286  Before trial, Ball moved to suppress the drugs 
found in the medicine bottle on the ground that the officer had exceeded the 
scope of a lawful Terry frisk.287  At the suppression hearing, the officer 
testified that he had been involved in more than 100 drug-related arrests, 
that he was familiar with the ways drugs are packaged and hidden, and that 
he had arrested many people who hid illegal narcotics in medicine 
bottles.288  The trial court found that Ball’s actions gave the officer a 
reasonable basis to believe Ball might be armed, justifying a Terry frisk for 
weapons.289  Conflating the immediately apparent requirement with the 
probable cause requirement, the trial court found that the object in Ball’s 
pocket was immediately apparent to the officer as a medicine bottle and that 
the officer had probable cause to believe the medicine bottle contained 
narcotics given “the combination of feeling the bottle, knowing it was a 
bottle, the size of the bottle, the experience of the officer with regard to the 
packaging of narcotics in this kind of container and the defendant’s 
actions.”290  Even though it could not have been immediately apparent to 
the officer that the hard cylindrical container he felt contained contraband 
as opposed to vitamins or some other lawful substance, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that in light of Ball’s 
suspicious conduct and the officer’s extensive experience with the practices 
of drug traffickers, the officer had probable cause to believe there were 
illegal drugs in the medicine bottle and therefore the warrantless search of 
the medicine bottle was justified under the plain feel doctrine.291
 
283 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
284 Id. 
285 See id. 
286 Id. at 972. 
287 Id. at 974. 
288 Id. at 973. 
289 Id. at 973–74. 
290 Id. at 974. 
291 Id.  In contrast, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the warrantless search of a Tic 
Tac box found during a lawful Terry frisk was not justified under the plain feel doctrine even 
though the police officer who conducted the search testified that in previous cases, he had 
come across the same type of plastic container and the containers in those cases had 
concealed drugs.  Ex parte Warren, 783 So. 2d 86, 88 (Ala. 2000).  The Alabama Supreme 
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The trial court was correct to find there was reasonable suspicion to 
support the frisk.  Ball kept trying to reach for something in his jacket 
pocket even though the officer told him not to do so.  The officer could 
have reasonably believed Ball was trying to reach for a weapon.  The court, 
however, erroneously found that the warrantless search of the medicine 
bottle was justified under the plain feel doctrine.  While the officer may 
have had reasonable grounds to believe that there were drugs in the 
medicine bottle, its contents could not have been immediately apparent to 
the officer.  When the officer found the medicine bottle, he should have 
seized it and then sought a warrant to search it.  Once the medicine bottle 
was within the officer’s exclusive possession and control, there was little 
danger that Ball could have obtained a weapon or destroyed any evidence 
within the container. 
3. Conflating the Reasonable Suspicion Needed to Stop with the Reasonable 
Suspicion Needed to Frisk and Extending Terry to Include Frisks of 
Containers on the Person 
One problem with the Terry stop and frisk doctrine is that courts often 
conflate the justification required for a stop with the justification required 
for a frisk.  As discussed earlier, an officer may stop an individual if the 
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal 
activity or has committed a traffic violation.292  Once the officer has 
lawfully stopped an individual, he may then conduct a limited pat-down 
frisk of the individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the 
individual is armed and dangerous.293
 
Court held that the drugs in the Tic Tac box had to be excluded because the incriminating 
character of the contents of the hard-shell container could not have been immediately 
apparent to the officer and the officer could not have had probable cause to believe the 
container contained contraband before he opened it.  Id. at 94.  The court recognized that 
there is a split of authority amongst the lower courts over whether the seizure of a container 
such as a Tic Tac box, matchbox, pill bottle, or film container complies with the 
requirements of the plain feel doctrine.  Id. at 93.  After reviewing the relevant cases, the 
court concluded that the better reasoned view was that it did not: “if the object detected by 
the officers touched during a Terry search is a hard-shell, closed container, then the 
incriminating nature of any contents of that container cannot be immediately apparent to the 
officer until he seizes it and opens it.  In such a situation, the officer cannot satisfy the 
Dickerson requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe, before seizing it, that 
the object is contraband.”  Id. at 94. 
  In other words, the officer needs two 
292 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 
781, 784 (2009) (holding that the first Terry requirement, a lawful investigative stop, is met 
whenever a police officer has the lawful authority to detain a car and its occupants for a 
traffic violation and that “police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of 
the vehicle is involved in criminal activity”). 
293 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 
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different justifications to stop and frisk an individual.  He needs reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to stop the individual, and he needs 
reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous in order to 
frisk him.  The only time the officer’s right to frisk flows automatically 
from the right to stop is when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the 
individual is involved in a crime of violence.294
In several cases, the Court has conflated these two requirements.  For 
example, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, the Court assumed that the officers 
had reason to suspect that Dickerson was involved in criminal activity and 
was armed and dangerous.  The Court’s conclusion that the officers had a 
reasonable suspicion that Dickerson was involved in criminal activity was 
not problematic.  Dickerson had just left a notorious crack house and had 
tried to avoid the officers when he saw them.
 
295  The officers could have 
reasonably concluded that these actions suggested Dickerson had just 
engaged in a drug transaction.  However, it was a stretch to conclude that 
these same facts gave the officers reasonable suspicion that Dickerson was 
armed and dangerous unless one believes that all low-level drug users carry 
guns.  Indeed, in an earlier case, the Court acknowledged that just because 
one associates with narcotics addicts does not mean one is armed and 
dangerous.296
In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court again assumed the officers in 





294 Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 when arguably all the officers had was reasonable suspicion to stop.  
In Wardlow, two uniformed officers in a police caravan patrolling a high 
crime neighborhood known for drug dealing spotted Wardlow standing next 
295 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 368–69 (1993). 
296 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63–64 (1968).  In finding the frisk in question 
unlawful, the Sibron Court noted, “The suspect’s mere act of talking with a number of 
known narcotics addicts over an eight hour period no more gives rise to reasonable fear of 
life or limb on the part of the police officer than it justifies an arrest for committing a crime.”  
Id. at 64.  Some lower courts have opined that drug dealers often carry weapons, supporting 
the view that reasonable suspicion that an individual is a drug dealer gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion that the individual is also armed and dangerous.  See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 
945 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1991).  In Dickerson, however, the officers had no reason to suspect 
Dickerson was a drug dealer as opposed to merely a buyer or user of drugs.  See Stanley A. 
Goldman, To Flee or Not to Flee—That Is the Question: Flight as Furtive Gesture, 37 IDAHO 
L. REV. 557, 575 (2001) (noting “[t]hat Mr. Dickerson was thus a drug suspect appears to be 
the only . . . basis for the officers’ belief that he was armed and posed a danger”); see also 
David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped 
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 676 (1994) (noting that courts often “fail to distinguish 
between drug use or possession on the one hand and drug trafficking on the other for 
purposes of judging whether the defendant might be armed.”).  
297 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). 
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to a building holding an opaque bag.298  Wardlow looked in the direction of 
the officers, then turned the other way and started to run.299  The officers 
chased Wardlow and when they caught up with him, one officer frisked him 
and found a gun in the bag he was holding.300  Wardlow was charged with 
unlawful use of a firearm by a convicted felon, and filed a motion to 
suppress the gun found during the stop and frisk.301
Wardlow is usually cited for the proposition that flight from police 
officers alone is not sufficient for reasonable suspicion, but flight from 
police officers plus something else, like being in a high crime 
neighborhood, can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
stop an individual.
 
302  What is interesting about Wardlow, however, is the 
fact that the Court did not spend any appreciable time discussing whether 
the police officers who frisked Wardlow had the required reasonable 
suspicion to believe Wardlow was armed and dangerous.  Wardlow was not 
a case where the officers had reason to suspect Wardlow of a crime of 
violence, so unless one subscribes to the view that wherever there are drugs, 
there are guns, the officers at most had reason to suspect Wardlow was 
involved in a drug crime, but no reason to suspect he was armed and 
dangerous.303
Moreover, in allowing the gun found in the bag Wardlow was holding 
to be admitted into evidence, the Wardlow decision suggested that a Terry 
frisk includes not just a limited pat-down of the outer clothing of the 





298 Id. at 121–22. 
  The Court in Terry never said that a frisk of the person includes 
a frisk of containers, but Wardlow implies that a frisk of the person includes 
299 Id. at 122. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Wardlow 
for the proposition that a suspect’s nervous, evasive behavior or flight from police alone may 
be insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, but might corroborate an otherwise 
insufficient tip); United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Wardlow 
for the proposition that “flight upon noticing police, plus some other indicia of wrongdoing, 
can constitute reasonable suspicion”); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(citing Wardlow in noting that “[a]n individual’s flight from police combined with other 
observations by a police officer may support reasonable suspicion sufficient for detention 
under Terry”). 
303 The officer said he frisked Wardlow because in his experience, it was common for 
there to be weapons in the near vicinity of drug transactions.  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122. 
304 In reversing the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court which had affirmed the trial 
court’s decision to suppress the gun, Wardlow could be read as approving the frisk of 
Wardlow.  In a footnote, however, the Wardlow Court stated, “We express no opinion as to 
the lawfulness of the frisk independently of the stop.”  Id. at 124 n.2. 
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a frisk of containers on the person.  On the one hand, concern for officer 
safety supports allowing an officer who is patting down a suspect for 
weapons to search containers on the suspect’s person that might contain a 
weapon.  On the other hand, once the officer seizes the container and has it 
under his exclusive possession and control, the chance that the suspect will 
be able to access a weapon within the container is substantially diminished.  
This overlooked extension of the Terry stop and frisk doctrine in Wardlow 
brings the Terry doctrine closer to the search incident to arrest doctrine and 
its treatment of containers found either on or near the arrestee’s person.305
4. Terry Frisks of the Car and Containers Within the Car 
 
The Terry stop and frisk doctrine further undermines the Container 
Doctrine by allowing police officers to conduct warrantless searches of the 
passenger compartment of the car when they reasonably suspect that the 
individual stopped is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon in the 
car.306  In such a case, the officer may conduct a Terry frisk of the 
passenger compartment of the car for weapons.307  The Terry frisk of the car 
may include a search of any containers within the passenger compartment 
that might contain a weapon.308
E. ADMINISTRATIVE (A.K.A SPECIAL NEEDS) SEARCHES 
 
Another way police officers may engage in warrantless container 
searches is through the administrative search exception, also known as the 
 
305 When the Court upheld the warrantless search of a crumpled up cigarette package 
found in an arrestee’s shirt pocket as a search incident to arrest in United States v. Robinson, 
Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that once the officer seized the cigarette package, the 
container was in his exclusive possession and control and there was no danger that the 
arrestee could gain access to a weapon or evidence within the package.  414 U.S. 218, 256 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Rejecting Justice Marshall’s suggestion that the officer 
should have gotten a warrant before opening the package, the Robinson Court said that since 
Robinson was validly arrested, the officer had the right to conduct a full search of 
Robinson’s person, including any packages or containers found on him.  Id. at 236.  Because 
Robinson had already been subjected to a full custodial arrest, any further intrusion into his 
privacy interests were minimal.  Id. at 235.  This rationale for allowing officers to conduct 
warrantless searches of containers found on an arrestee’s person, however, does not apply 
when an officer finds a container on the person of an individual stopped on suspicion of 
criminal activity, but not arrested.  The reason we allow officers to conduct stops and frisks 
upon less than probable cause is because the intrusion on privacy and liberty is supposedly 
much less than the intrusion on privacy and liberty when a person is arrested and taken into 
custody.  Id.  In suggesting that the frisk of Wardlow and the search of the paper bag he was 
holding was lawful, the Wardlow Court elided this distinction between stops and arrests. 
306 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
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special needs exception.309  The administrative search exception is an 
umbrella exception which includes, inter alia, border searches, inventory 
searches, vehicle checkpoint searches, government employee searches, 
prisoner searches, and searches of high school students.  It has been used to 
validate a high school principal’s warrantless search of a student’s purse,310 
the warrantless search of a government employee’s office,311 and the 
warrantless search of a backpack found in a van impounded by a police 
officer.312
Under the administrative search doctrine, the court first evaluates 
whether the government has a special need, above and beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, to engage in the search.
 
313  If so, then the court 
balances the government’s interests against the individual’s interest in 
privacy, and decides whether the government’s interests outweigh the 
individual’s interest.314  In its administrative search jurisprudence, the Court 
most clearly reflects its embrace of the Reasonableness view of the Fourth 
Amendment, for the ultimate inquiry in every administrative search case is 
whether the search is reasonable.315  Critics of the special needs exception 
have pointed out that in virtually every case where the Court has found a 
special need, it has ruled in favor of the government, finding that the 
governmental interests outweighed the individual’s interest.316
 
309 For more detailed discussion of the Court’s administrative search jurisprudence, see 
Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the 
Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223 (2004) (arguing against an individualized 
suspicion requirement in the administrative search context); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of 
Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 483, 544–618 (1995) (arguing that individualized suspicion should be a 
component of reasonableness analysis even in administrative search cases); William J. 
Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
553 (1992) (arguing that the Court should follow a contracts model in the special needs 
context, asking what kind of search rule the government and innocent targets would adopt if 
negotiating such a rule in advance).   
 
310 See New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
311 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
312 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
313 Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 
1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 109 (noting that as a threshold inquiry, the Court asks whether 
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable 
cause requirements impracticable). 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 See, e.g., Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “Special Needs” and the Fourth Amendment: 
An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
529, 551 (1997) (“In every case where the Court has found a special need and eschewed the 
requirements of a warrant and probable cause, it has concluded that the governmental 
interest outweighed the privacy interest . . . .”); see also Arcila, supra note 309, at 1224 (“In 
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The administrative search exception was used to uphold checkpoints 
set up by the New York Police Department (NYPD) to search the 
containers of New York subway riders.317  In response to a series of attacks 
on the London subway and bus systems in July 2005, the NYPD established 
a Container Inspection Program to deter terrorists from carrying explosives 
on to New York’s subway system and to uncover any such attempts.318  
Under this program, the NYPD established container inspection 
checkpoints at selected subway facilities where uniformed officers would 
search the bags of a portion of individuals entering the subway station.319
In MacWade v. Kelly, the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality 
of NYPD’s Container Inspection Program against a Fourth Amendment 
challenge.
 
320  Subway riders represented by the New York Civil Liberties 
Union sued Raymond Kelly, commissioner of the NYPD, and the City of 
New York, arguing that NYPD’s Container Inspection Program violated the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.321
 
all but one of the Supreme Court’s special needs cases, the Court has been deferential to 
governmental justifications”); Stuntz, supra note 
  After a two-day bench trial, Judge 
309, at 554 (noting that the term “special 
need” is “no more than a label that indicates when a lax standard will apply.”). 
317 See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). 
318 Id. at 264.  A supervising sergeant established a selection rate, such as every fifth 
person, based on the number of officers available and the volume of passengers at that 
checkpoint.  A large poster close to the table notified riders that “backpacks and other 
containers [are] subject to inspection.”  Announcements to the same effect were made in the 
subway station and on the trains.  A supervising sergeant at the checkpoint used a bullhorn to 
tell subway passengers that all persons wishing to enter the station would be subject to a 
container search and to warn those wishing to avoid the search to leave the station.  Officers 
assigned to these checkpoints were instructed to search only those containers capable of 
carrying an explosive device.  Once an officer identified such a container, the officer was to 
limit his inspection to what was minimally necessary to ensure that the container did not 
contain an explosive device.  Officers were instructed to not intentionally look for 
contraband other than explosives, but if an officer incidentally discovered such contraband, 
he could arrest the individual carrying it.  Officers were told not to attempt to read any 
written or printed material.  Additionally, officers were instructed not to record a passenger’s 
personal information such as his or her name and address.  Declining a search would not be 
grounds for an arrest, although police were authorized to arrest anyone who refused to be 
searched and later attempted to reenter the subway system with the uninspected container.  
Id. at 264–65.  NYPD set up container inspection checkpoints at least thirty-five times a year 
in each of the city’s 468 subway stations.  Al Baker, Subway Searches Go on Quietly, Just 
How Police Like Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/nyregion/06bags.html. 
319 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 265.  Although where the subway checkpoints were 
established seemed the result of random selection, the NYPD had reasons for selecting 
certain facilities over others, reasons which they kept secret to avoid letting potential 
terrorists know which subway stations would have checkpoints.  Id. at 264. 
320 Id. at 275. 
321 Id. at 263; see also MacWade v. Kelly, 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31281, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2005) (noting that plaintiffs were represented by the New York Civil 
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Richard Berman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York found the Container Inspection Program constitutional pursuant to the 
special needs exception and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.322
Applying special needs analysis to the case at hand, the Second Circuit 
agreed with the district court’s finding that the Container Inspection 
Program served the special need of preventing a terrorist attack on the 
subway.
  The 
plaintiffs appealed. 
323  The court of appeals then balanced the government’s interests 
against the subway riders’ interests.  Despite finding that subway riders 
have full, not diminished, expectations of privacy in their containers,324 the 
court found that given the substantial interest in preventing a terrorist attack 
on the subway, the Container Inspection Program was a reasonably 
effective means of addressing the government’s interest in deterring and 
detecting a terrorist attack and intruded upon subway riders’ privacy 
interests only to a minimal degree.325
MacWade builds on cases upholding warrantless searches of suitcases 
and other luggage at airports.  Since the 1970s, lower courts have almost 
uniformly held that warrantless searches of luggage at airports are 
reasonable because of the government’s interest in protecting the safety of 





Liberties Union).  Another lawsuit was filed against the NYPD in February 2009 by Jangir 
Sultan, a thirty-two-year-old native New Yorker of Kashmiri descent who was stopped and 
searched by police officers twenty-one times between July 2005, when the NYPD initiated 
the subway checkpoint program, and June 2008.  NYCLU Lawsuit Targets Racial Profiling 
at Subway Checkpoints, NYCLU.ORG, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.nyclu.org/node/2252/print 
(last visited 5/27/2009).  The New York Civil Liberties Union, representing Sultan, alleged 
that Sultan’s South Asian appearance was the only factor that could explain his persistent 
targeting by police officers.  Id.  The New York Civil Liberties Union also asserted that the 
checkpoint program’s design invites racial profiling because officers are forbidden from 
recording any demographic information about the people selected.  Id. 
 
322 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 263. 
323 Id. at 270. 
324 Id. at 272–73. 
325 Id. at 275.  But see Recent Case, MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006), 
120 HARV. L. REV. 635 (2006) (arguing that in finding the subway checkpoint program 
constitutional after determining that subjects of searches enjoyed a full expectation of 
privacy in their containers, the Second Circuit diminished the role of the individual’s interest 
in privacy in the special needs analysis, making it easier for future courts to find other 
warrantless searches constitutional under the special needs doctrine). 
326 United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500–01 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding FAA 
regulations permitting the use of metal detectors to search carry-on baggage at airports); 
United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The courts have consistently 
held airport security measures constitutionally justified as a limited and relatively 
insignificant intrusion of privacy balanced against the need to protect aircraft and its 
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While most people are familiar with the searches of luggage that 
routinely take place at our nation’s airports, few know that government 
officials are now conducting warrantless, suspicionless searches of laptops 
belonging to international travelers.  Since July 2008, the Department of 
Homeland Security has permitted federal agents at the border or its 
functional equivalent to seize electronic devices capable of storing 
information in digital or analog form, such as laptop computers, cell 
phones, iPods, pagers, and beepers, without a warrant for an unspecified 
period of time.327  Federal agents may copy data within these devices 
without a warrant or any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.328  The 
contents of a laptop may be shared with other agencies and private entities 
for language translation or data decryption.329  Between October 2008 and 
June 2010, more than 6,000 travelers have had their laptops searched under 
this policy.330
Permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches of laptops is 
inconsistent with the Container Doctrine’s insistence that law enforcement 
officers obtain judicial authorization before searching a container.  It is also 
a departure from previous rules that recognized the special needs involved 
in policing the border, but required probable cause to believe a crime had 
been or was being committed before federal agents could copy material that 




passengers.”); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding 
warrantless search of briefcase at airport given the “unquestionably grave and urgent” need 
to prevent airline hijacking). 
  Nonetheless, at least one federal 
327 Ellen Nakashima, Expanded Powers to Search Travelers at Border Detailed, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A2 (discussing U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION POLICY 
REGARDING BORDER SEARCH OF INFORMATION (July 16, 2008); U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, BORDER SEARCHES OF DOCUMENTS AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 
Directive No. 7-6.0 (July 16, 2008)). 
328 Id. 
329 Ellen Nakashima, Travelers’ Laptops May Be Detained at Border, WASH. POST, Aug. 
1, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2008/08/01/AR20080080103030_pf.html. 
330 Ellen Nakashima, New Lawsuit to Challenge Laptop Searches at U.S. Border, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 7, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/ 
article/2010/09/07/AR2010090700845.html. 
331 Nakashima, supra note 327, at A1.  Laptop computers often contain highly sensitive 
personal information, including financial and medical information.  If one uses a laptop to 
surf the internet, a history of websites visited may be revealed during a search.  See Orin S. 
Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 543 (2005) (noting 
that browsers used to surf the World Wide Web are typically programmed to automatically 
retain information about websites users have visited in recent weeks and that users can use 
this history to retrace their steps or find webpages previously visited); Editorial, Search and 
Replace: Congress Needs to Set the Rules for How Border Agents Can Delve into Travelers’ 
Laptops, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2008, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost/ 
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circuit court of appeals has upheld a warrantless, suspicionless search of a 
laptop under the border search doctrine, rejecting the argument that laptops, 
like homes, are repositories of highly personal information.332  Whether 
laptop computers and other electronic devices should be treated like 
traditional portable containers is a question that has divided the lower 
courts.333
 
wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AF200808120202744-pf.html.  While the governmental 
need to protect the safety of the nation against the threat of terrorism is a weighty one, it is 
not clear that allowing federal agents to search all laptops at the border without any reason to 
suspect that the laptop owner is engaging in or has engaged in terrorism or criminal activity 
is necessary or appropriate in light of the significant intrusion on privacy interests that such 
searches entail. 
 
332 See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Arnold’s analogy 
to a search of a home based on a laptop’s storage capacity is without merit.”); see also 
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (refusing to recognize a First 
Amendment exception to the border search doctrine in cases involving laptops).  But see 
Christine A. Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the Border 
Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971 (2007) (arguing that laptop 
searches at the border should be predicated by reasonable suspicion); Ari B. Fontecchio, 
Note, Suspicionless Laptop Searches Under the Border Search Doctrine: The Fourth 
Amendment Exception that Swallows Your Laptop, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 231 (2009) (arguing 
that suspicionless laptop searches at the border compromise border security by diverting 
attention from the more important task of preventing the entry of weapons); Marianne Leach, 
Note, Fliers Beware: The Ninth Circuit Decision, United States v. Arnold, Granted Customs 
Agents Access Into Your Laptops, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 307 (2009) (arguing that 
reasonable suspicion should be required before government officials search laptops at the 
border).  In September 2010, the ACLU filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland 
Security, arguing that its laptop search policy violates the Fourth Amendment.  Press 
Release, ACLU, Abidor v. Napolitano: The ACLU Challenges Suspicionless Laptop Border 
Policy (Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/free-speech-technology-and-
liberty/abidor-v-napolitano; Nakashima, supra note 330. 
333 See, e.g., People v. Emerson, 766 N.Y.S.2d 482, 487, 490 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (treating 
computers and computer files as closed containers); United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 
929, 936–37 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protection of closed computer 
files and hard drives is similar to the protection it affords a person’s closed containers.”); 
United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385, 1391 (D. Nev. 1991) (treating handheld computer 
memo book as a container).  But see United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his computer disks and hard drive were the 
equivalent of closed containers, and therefore absent exigent circumstances, the government 
needed a search warrant to search his computer); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth 
Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 
MISS. L.J. 193, 195 (2005) (arguing that computers are containers and that computer 
searches should be treated just like other container searches).  The government’s laptop 
search policy in essence treats laptop computers like containers that are routinely searched at 
airports.   
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F. INVENTORY SEARCHES 
Another way law enforcement officials can search a container without 
a warrant is through an inventory search.  When an officer takes a person or 
vehicle into custody, police department regulations may authorize the 
officer to take an inventory of property taken from the individual or vehicle.  
Those regulations may allow the officer to open closed containers so that 
the contents of the containers can be inventoried.  While inventory searches 
are a type of administrative search, I discuss them separately because the 
Court has specified a set of criteria that must be met for an inventory search 
to be valid, which differs from the usual special needs plus balancing 
inquiry that is conducted in most administrative search cases. 
In order for an inventory search to be valid, the officer (1) must have 
been acting in accordance with standardized criteria,334 and (2) must not 
have acted in bad faith, i.e., for the sole purpose of searching for evidence 
of criminal wrongdoing.335  The inventory or recording of items taken is 
done to protect the individual’s property from theft and to protect the police 
against false claims of lost or stolen property.336  The Court has made clear 
that under this exception, police may search containers found on an 
individual’s person337 or in a motor vehicle338
In Colorado v. Bertine, the Court rejected an argument that the 
Container Doctrine applied to invalidate the warrantless search of a 
backpack found in a van during an inventory of the van.
 as long as the search is 
conducted in accordance with standardized inventory procedures. 
339
 
334 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374–75 (1987).  In Florida v. Wells, the Court 
noted that while the requirement of standardized criteria is intended to limit the discretion of 
the inventorying officer, it is not intended to strip police officers of all discretion.  495 U.S. 
1, 4 (1990) (invalidating search of locked suitcase found in trunk of car during inventory 
search where highway patrol had no policy with regard to whether closed containers 
encountered during an inventory search could be opened).  In the Court’s view, a police 
officer may be given discretion “to determine whether a container should or should not be 
opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself.”  Id.  
“Thus, while policies of opening all containers or of opening no containers are 
unquestionably permissible, it would be equally permissible, for example, to allow the 
opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain 
from examining the containers’ exteriors.”  Id. at 607. 
  The Court 
distinguished this case from Chadwick and Sanders on the ground that in 
those cases, the search was solely for the purpose of investigating criminal 
335 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.  But see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (holding 
subjective motivations of police officer irrelevant to lawfulness of inventory search). 
336 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371–72. 
337 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (shoulder bag defendant was carrying). 
338 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 739 (backpack in defendant’s van). 
339 Id. 
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activity while in this case, the officer was just inventorying the contents of 
the van he was impounding.340
G. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Warrantless container searches are also permitted under what is called 
the exigent circumstances exception.  This exception to the warrant 
requirement is somewhat of a catch-all, permitting police to conduct 
warrantless searches whenever an emergency situation exists.  The precise 
requirements of the exigent circumstances exception are not hard and fast, 
but generally, the police must be dealing with an emergency situation that 
makes obtaining a warrant impracticable and the officer conducting the 
search must have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be 
found in the place searched.341  Additionally, the emergency that justifies 
the police action limits the appropriate scope of the search.342
Even when it established the Container Doctrine, the Court recognized 
that a warrant would not be required if police were dealing with an 
emergency situation in which lives would be lost, individuals harmed, or 
evidence destroyed if they took the time required to obtain a warrant before 
conducting the search.
  Thus, if 
police reasonably believe that stolen shotguns are being stored in a shed and 
about to be moved, they may only search places or containers within the 
shed that might contain a shotgun. 
343  Lower courts have authorized warrantless 
searches of containers under the exigent circumstances exception when 
police reasonably believed the container at issue contained explosives.344  




341 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
179–80 (5th ed. 2010). 
342 Id. at 179. 
343 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“In our view, when no 
exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search, the Warrant Clause places 
the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion 
of police authority.”). 
344 United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1229 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding warrantless 
search of suitcase in trunk permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement because officer had probable cause to believe suitcase could contain 
explosives). 
345 Under the emergency aid doctrine, which is different from the exigent circumstances 
exception, police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened 
with such injury.  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
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have permitted warrantless searches of containers when the search was 
reasonably believed necessary to assist an unconscious or injured person.346
H. REOPENING A CONTAINER AFTER A PRIOR LAWFUL OPENING  
 
In 1983, the Court eroded the Container Doctrine even further when it 
held that a search of a container after a prior lawful opening and controlled 
delivery does not require a warrant.347
when a carrier, usually an airline, unexpectedly discovers what seems to be 
contraband while inspecting luggage to learn the identity of its owner, or when the 
contraband falls out of a broken or damaged piece of luggage, or when the carrier 
exercises its inspection privilege because some suspicious circumstance has caused it 
concern that it may unwittingly be transporting contraband.
  A controlled delivery typically 
occurs  
348
After such a discovery, law enforcement agents frequently “restore the 
contraband to its container, then close or reseal the container, and authorize 
the carrier to deliver it to its owner.”
   
349  When the owner takes delivery, he 
is arrested.350  In Illinois v. Andreas, the Court held that there is no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a sealed container 
previously opened under lawful authority and that a warrant is not required 
to re-open the container absent a substantial likelihood that the contents 
have been changed.351
V. FROM WARRANT PREFERENCE TO REASONABLENESS WITH TEETH 
 
The gradual erosion of the Container Doctrine and the Court’s 
corresponding shift from warrants to reasonableness is problematic for 
many reasons.  The shift reflects the Court’s preference for ex post 
reasonableness review over ex ante judicial review through the warrant 
process.  Ex post reasonableness review is not necessarily bad, but is highly 
deferential as currently applied, operating as a rubber stamp of approval in 
favor of the challenged governmental action.352
 
346 United States v. Black, 860 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a warrantless 
search of unconscious individual’s purse for identification or medication was reasonable 
given the emergency situation at hand); United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 
1973) (holding that a warrantless search of locked briefcase for identification of individual 
found unconscious and foaming at the mouth was permissible to deal with the emergency). 
  Additionally, because the 
347 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 773 (1983). 
348 Id. at 770. 
349 Id. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. at 773. 
352 See Colb, supra note 38, at 1687–88 (noting that in cases where the Court applies 
reasonableness balancing, it applies a “relaxed and deferential approach to the balancing at 
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Court has failed to define reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context, 
reasonableness remains a vague and amorphous standard that provides little 
guidance to police officers, attorneys, and lower courts. 
Less obviously, the erosion of the Container Doctrine 
disproportionately harms poor people, and by implication poor people of 
color.353  As William Stuntz has observed, by protecting privacy 
expectations, the Fourth Amendment protects those with more privacy to 
begin with, which generally means wealthier individuals who can afford to 
live in nice homes.354  For various reasons, the poor are more likely than the 
wealthy to be found outside the home and on the street where they and their 
portable containers are more susceptible to being searched without a 
warrant.355
Allowing police officers to search containers without a warrant also 
undermines the concerns that originally motivated the Court to establish the 
Container Doctrine: protecting the heightened expectations of privacy that 
attend to the contents of portable containers and ensuring that the probable 
cause determination is made by a neutral and detached judicial officer, 
rather than a police officer.  Given the numerous exceptions to the warrant 
requirement that enable police officers to search containers without a 
warrant, portable containers no longer enjoy their previous privileged status 
at the top of the spectrum of Fourth Amendment protection.
 
356
In requiring police officers to obtain a warrant prior to searching a 
container, the Court situated itself squarely on the side of warrants when it 
established the Container Doctrine.  While the Container Doctrine’s warrant 
requirement seems at odds with the reasonableness view of the Fourth 
Amendment, it may be possible to accommodate both the concerns that 
 
 
hand”); Maclin, supra note 16, at 199 (arguing that Fourth Amendment questions tend to be 
resolved using a test that approximates the deferential rational basis test). 
353 See infra text accompanying notes 335–356. 
354 William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1265, 1266–67 (1999). 
355 See supra Part IV.A.2. for a discussion of how the erosion of the Container Doctrine 
disproportionately hurts the poor. 
356 While some of these exceptions, such as the search incident to arrest and consent 
doctrines, also apply in the home, many of the exceptions that enable police to search 
containers without a warrant do not apply to containers in homes.  For example, the 
automobile exception and the Terry stop and frisk doctrine do not apply to searches in the 
home.  Terry searches and auto searches typically occur on the street.  See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968) (“This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth 
Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman 
investigating suspicious circumstances.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 403 (1985) 
(“The automobile exception has been developed to ameliorate the practical problems 
associated with the search of vehicles that have been stopped on the streets or public 
highways because there was probable cause to believe they were transporting contraband.”). 
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originally animated the Container Doctrine and the Court’s current 
preference for an open-ended reasonableness standard over a more precise 
warrant requirement.  I suggest below that the Court may be able to 
accommodate these two seemingly divergent interests by embracing a more 
rigorous type of reasonableness review, which I call reasonableness with 
teeth.  To support my proposal, I look outside the criminal procedure arena 
and borrow from a small slice of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  
Drawing lessons from several equal protection cases in which the Supreme 
Court utilized a less deferential than usual rational basis review—what 
some have called “rational basis with bite”—to strike down legislation 
which discriminated against a politically unpopular group, I propose that 
courts similarly engage in more rigorous review—reasonableness with teeth 
—when deciding the constitutionality of warrantless container searches.  
Before explaining the concept of reasonableness with teeth, I explain why 
the erosion of the Container Doctrine should be of concern to anyone 
interested in maintaining a robust Fourth Amendment. 
A. WHY THE EROSION OF THE CONTAINER DOCTRINE IS 
PROBLEMATIC 
1. Problems with Normal Reasonableness Review 
As explained in Part III, the erosion of the Container Doctrine has 
largely tracked the Court’s movement away from warrants and its embrace 
of reasonableness as the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  
Instead of insisting that police officers obtain a warrant before engaging in a 
search unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, the Court 
allows police officers to search first, subject to later judicial review for 
reasonableness. 
When courts engage in reasonableness review, they tend to balance the 
individual’s interests in privacy and dignity against the government’s 
interests.357
 
357 Balancing tests are not without their critics.  Alexander Aleinikoff identifies serious 
problems with balancing tests in general.  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the 
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).  Wayne Holly critiques the Court’s 
reasonableness balancing methodology for “fail[ing] to account for the difference between a 
‘right’ guaranteed by the Constitution and an individual or government’s mere ‘interest’ in 
achieving a particular goal.”  Holly, supra note 
  The ultimate inquiry is whether the search was reasonable 
given all the circumstances.  Reasonableness review offers the advantage of 
flexibility and attention to context.  Because reasonableness is an open-
ended concept, courts utilizing reasonableness review may, in theory, take 
into account any and all circumstances that might be relevant.  In practice, 
however, courts engaging in reasonableness review tend to focus primarily 
21, at 556–57. 
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on two factors: the government’s interest in conducting the search and the 
individual’s interest in privacy.  At a time when Americans seem 
increasingly willing to trade privacy for convenience (think of the amount 
of personal information people are willing to put on Facebook),358
a. The Traditional Critique of Reasonableness 
 
balancing these two interests is likely to result in more intrusive 
governmental activity given decreasing expectations of privacy. 
While balancing with an eye to reasonableness appears to be a fair way 
to determine whether someone’s Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated, it is not fair when the Supreme Court balances with its thumb on 
the scale in favor of the government.359  Rather than being neutral, Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness review tends to be highly deferential to the 
government.  So deferential that Tracey Maclin and other legal scholars 
often compare Fourth Amendment reasonableness review to rational basis 
review in the equal protection context.360  Just as courts engaging in equal 
protection rational basis review will invalidate social and economic 
legislation only if there is absolutely no rational explanation, real or 
imagined, for the legislation, courts engaging in Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness review will invalidate a search or seizure “only when the 
police act irrationally.”361  If the reviewing court “can identify any plausible 
goal or reason that promotes law enforcement interests,”362
 
358 See Dan Fletcher, Friends Without Borders, TIME, May 31, 2010, at 32, 32–35 
(noting that 500 million people subscribe to Facebook and that with 48 billion unique 
images, Facebook houses the world’s largest photo collection); see also Monica Hesse, 
Status Symbol: Look at Facebook Now, WASH. POST, July 23, 2010, at A1 (arguing that 
either Facebook has ruined our concept of privacy or privacy is an outdated construct). 
 the challenged 
359 See Davies, note 145, at 3–6 (arguing that two factors account for the Rehnquist 
Court’s tendency to defer to the government in Fourth Amendment cases: (1) the 
composition of the Court, and (2) the fact that the Justices refuse to be bound by 
constitutional doctrine and principles).  The Court itself has acknowledged that in cases 
where it finds probable cause, it does not actually balance but almost always finds in favor of 
the government.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817–18 (1996) (noting that 
while in principle, every Fourth Amendment case involves a balancing of all relevant factors 
to determine reasonableness, in practice, where probable cause is found, the only cases 
where the Court actually balances is when searches or seizures are conducted in an 
extraordinary manner). 
360 Maclin, supra note 16, at 199 (“Fourth Amendment questions are resolved using a 
test that approximates the rational basis standard, which is the test used to decide equal 
protection and due process challenges to social and economic legislation.”); see also Stuntz, 
supra note 309, at 554 (“The Supreme Court’s generalized ‘reasonableness’ standard 
resembles not negligence, but rational basis constitutional review: when the standard applies, 
the government wins, save perhaps for a few egregious cases.”). 
361 Maclin, supra note 16, at 200.   
362 Id. 
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police conduct will be considered reasonable and not in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  While it may make sense to defer to the government 
when the court is reviewing social and economic legislation that does not 
impact a suspect class or fundamental right, reasonableness review in the 
Fourth Amendment context should not be deferential given the concerns 
about government overreaching that animated our founding fathers to 
include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.363
A second problem with reasonableness review is the lack of guidance 
that the Court has provided to lower courts deciding the validity of searches 
under a generalized reasonableness standard.  Instead of a bright-line rule, 
the reasonableness approach allows reviewing courts to decide whether a 
search was lawful without any benchmarks to guide them in this difficult 
decision.  This lack of guidance is particularly striking given that the Court 
has on numerous occasions spoken of the importance of having bright-line 
rules in the Fourth Amendment context to guide police officers who often 
need to make quick, on-the-spot decisions in the field.
  The judiciary 
should not abdicate its responsibility of checking the executive when a 
fundamental right is at issue. 
364  In the hustle and 
bustle of daily trial practice, trial courts also have to make quick decisions.  
An abstract reasonableness standard provides little guidance to help them 
make such decisions.365
b. The Critique of Reasonableness from the Left 
 
Beyond the traditional critique of reasonableness, both feminist theory 
and critical race theory offer additional insights.  First, in purporting to be 
neutral and objective, a reasonableness standard can mask the fact that what 
the law considers reasonable is often just what those in positions of 
authority consider to be reasonable.366  As Dana Raigrodski notes, 
“[R]easonableness and common sense have always been assigned a race 
(white), a gender (male), and a class (wealthy).”367
 
363 Id. at 201 (arguing that the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of 
police power and discretion). 
 
364 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991); New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 458 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).  For a critique of 
the Court’s embrace of bright line rules in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see 
Alschuler, supra note 37. 
365 I thank Jenny Roberts for this observation. 
366 Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the 
Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153 (2008). 
367 Id. at 187.  For an excellent analysis of the Wardlow Court’s failure to acknowledge 
the race, gender, and class implications of the case, see id. at 185–88. 
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Moreover, most reasonableness standards assume “some transcendent, 
universal knowledge, independent from and uninfluenced by the 
observer.”368  But as feminist scholars and race crits have long argued, 
gender, race, sexual orientation, and class, among other things, can 
influence not only the way one experiences life, but also the way one 
perceives the world.369
In a piercingly thoughtful analysis of the Florida v. Bostick 
decision,
 
370 Devon Carbado explains how Justice O’Connor’s color-blind 
ideology allowed her to ignore the influence that race could have had on the 
question whether the defendant was “seized” by police.371  The test for a 
seizure of the person at that time was whether a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s shoes would have felt free to leave.372
In Florida v. Bostick, two uniformed police officers boarded a bus 




368 Id. at 185; see also Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The 
Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1210–15 (1990) 
(providing an insightful critique of the “Reasonable Man” standard used in tort law). 
  Without any particularized reason to think 
that Terrance Bostick, a young African-American male, was carrying drugs, 
the officers asked Bostick to show identification and consent to a search of 
369 See John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing 
an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2144 
(1992) (noting that because the worlds of blacks and whites have been intensely separate 
since slavery, it is “no surprise that blacks and whites so often see quite different realities at 
both the perceptual and experiential levels”); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: 
Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 572 (1984) (“The 
uniformity of life experience of the inner circle of writers [a handful of white, male law 
professors] may color not only the way they conceptualize and frame problems of race, but 
also the solutions or remedies they devise.”); Camille A. Nelson, Lyrical Assault: Dancehall 
versus the Cultural Imperialism of the North-West, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 231, 263 
(2008) (arguing that sexual orientation, gender, class and race can influence whether and 
how one perceives threats to one’s person); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of 
Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1138, 1141 (2007) (noting that “race deeply affects the 
perceptions, experiences, consciousness, and opportunities of all Blacks, regardless of their 
ancestry and class status,” while arguing that ancestral heritage, including whether a Black 
student descended from slaves in the United States, should also play a role in the 
implementation of affirmative action policies); Raigrodski, supra note 366, at 185; see also 
Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 723, 723–24 (1992) (“Life experiences and personal perspective often 
influence how one envisions the substance and function of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights.”). 
370 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
371 Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 
(2002). 
372 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
373 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431. 
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his luggage.374  Bostick claimed he did not consent to a search of his 
luggage, but the officers thought Bostick consented, so they opened his 
suitcase and found cocaine within.375  Bostick was arrested and charged 
with trafficking in cocaine.376  Before trial, Bostick moved to suppress the 
cocaine found in his suitcase, arguing that it was seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.377
While Justice O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, does not 
decide whether Bostick was seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, she suggests that the encounter between Bostick and the 
officers on the bus was consensual and that a reasonable person in Bostick’s 
shoes would have felt free to leave.
 
378
Nowhere in Justice O’Connor’s opinion does she entertain the possibility that Bostick 
may have been targeted because he is black.  In fact, Justice O’Connor does not even 
mention Bostick’s race.  Nor does she mention the race of the officers.  In this sense, 
an argument can be made that Justice O’Connor’s analysis ignores race.  This 
argument, however, is only partially correct.  That is, while it is fair to say that Justice 
O’Connor’s analysis ignores the fact that Bostick is black and the officers are white, it 
is more accurate to say that her analysis constructs Bostick and the officers with the 
racial ideology of colorblindness.  In other words, the problem is not that Justice 
O’Connor does not see race, but rather that she sees race in a particular way.  Her 
decision to see Bostick as a man and not as a black man does not ignore race; it 
constructs race.
  Justice O’Connor is able to draw the 
conclusion that a reasonable person in Bostick’s shoes would have felt free 
to leave or terminate the encounter with the officer only by ignoring 
Bostick’s race.  As Carbado explains: 
379
Carbado explains why Justice O’Connor’s failure to acknowledge race 
in this case is relevant: 
 
The interaction of black male identity with white male police authority creates a 
physically confining social situation every bit as real as (and operating independently 
from) being on a bus.  Most, if not all, black people—especially black men—are 
apprehensive about police encounters.  They grow up with racial stories of police 
 
374 Id. 
375 Id. at 431–32 (“[T]here is a conflict in the evidence about whether the defendant 
consented to the search.”). 
376 Id. at 432. 
377 Id. 
378 Id. at 437 (“The facts of this case . . . leave some doubt whether a seizure occurred 
. . . .  Nevertheless, we refrain from deciding whether or not a seizure occurred in this 
case.”).  The test for a seizure of the person is whether the reasonable person in the 
defendant’s shoes would have felt free to leave or terminate the encounter with the police.  
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (establishing the “free to leave” test 
for seizures of the person); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429 (modifying test for a seizure when the 
reason the individual might not feel free to leave is not due to coercive actions of the police). 
379 Carbado, supra note 371, at 977–78. 
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abuse—witnessing them as public spectacles in the media, observing them firsthand in 
their communities, and experiencing them as daily realities.  Put another way, race-
based policing is part of black people’s collective consciousness.  Thus, when black 
people encounter the police, “[t]hey don’t know whether justice will be meted out or 
whether judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them.”  Yet, Justice 
O’Connor situates her seizure analysis outside of this racial reality.  She removes 
Bostick and the police officers from a social context in which race is material to a 
discursive, socially constructed world in which it is not.  At no time does Justice 
O’Connor consider how Bostick, or a man in his racial position, might have 
experienced two white police officers crowded around him on a bus.  She race 
neutralizes the encounter.  Bostick’s race, the race of the officers, and the relationship 
between the two receive no textual engagement in her analysis.  Thus, her opinion 
fails to consider that Bostick may have been the target of a particular racial 
preference.380
Similarly, Anthony Thompson provides a racial critique of the Terry v. 
Ohio decision, which held that a stop and frisk of two black men and their 
white companion was reasonable.
 
381  Thompson points out that Chief 
Justice Warren, writing the majority opinion in Terry, recounted the facts of 
the case in entirely race-neutral terms, never revealing that Terry and one of 
his companions were black and that Terry’s other companion and Detective 
McFadden were white.382  Thompson points out that only when one 
considers race does Detective McFadden’s assertion—that he couldn’t say 
precisely what drew his attention to the defendants and that he just didn’t 
like them—make sense.383
The problematic nature of open-ended reasonableness standards has 
led many feminist scholars to argue in favor of more subjective standards 




380 Id. at 985 (internal quotation deleted). 
  In the self-defense context, for 
381 Thompson, supra note 256, at 969 (arguing that the Court created a “police officer as 
expert” narrative to justify the stop and frisk); see also Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the 
Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting 
Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151, 214–15 (1994) (critiquing the 
presumption that police officers usually act from good motives). 
382 Thompson, supra note 256, at 964. 
383 Id. at 966 (“When one adds the missing racial element to the Court’s statement of 
facts, certain otherwise inexplicable events suddenly become much more comprehensible. 
Detective McFadden’s assertion that ‘he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye 
to [Terry and Chilton],’ an assertion accepted by the trial court and uncritically recited by the 
Supreme Court, assumes a new meaning when one views Terry as a case in which a white 
detective noticed—and then focused his attention on—two black men who were doing 
nothing more than standing on a street corner in downtown Cleveland in the middle of the 
afternoon.”). 
384 See, e.g., CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE 
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000); see also Dolores A. Donovan & 
Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-
Defense and Provocation, 14 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981).  But see Naomi R. Cahn, The 
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example, some feminist scholars have argued that battered women who kill 
their abusers in non-confrontational situations should not be held to the 
usual reasonable person standard, but instead should be compared to the 
average battered woman.385  In response to the feminist critique of 
reasonableness, some courts have openly embraced a reasonable woman 
standard in cases involving female defendants claiming self-defense.386  
Some courts have embraced a reasonable woman standard in the sexual 
harassment arena as well.387  In the Fourth Amendment context, Dana 
Raigrodski urges the Court to abandon reasonableness standards altogether 
and instead embrace the values of anti-subordination and empowerment.388
While I agree with the concerns raised by my fellow feminist and 
critical race colleagues, I do not see the Court jettisoning reasonableness as 
the cornerstone of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence anytime soon.  
Moreover, even if it wanted to, the Court could not abandon reasonableness 
as a requirement for a valid search or seizure.  The text of the Fourth 





Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (illustrating problems with a reasonable woman standard). 
  Given these considerations, my proposal for reform works 
385 See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. 
REV. 393, 415 (1988) (“Given that courts consider at least some of the particular defendant’s 
attributes and circumstances in defining the ‘reasonable person,’ they should likewise 
present an instruction that directs the jury to measure the defendant’s actions against those of 
the ‘reasonable battered woman.’”); see also Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted in 
Reasonable Self-Defense: An Abused Woman and a Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 
65, 77 (2008) (arguing that the reasonable person standard should be defined so as to “adopt 
all of the characteristics of the individual on trial”).  But see Holly Maguigan, Battered 
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 379, 444–45 (1991) (rejecting adoption of a reasonable battered woman 
standard); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist 
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 566 (1992) (“There 
is no single ‘reasonable woman,’ and I worry about the ways that adoption of a separate 
standard for battered women in particular or women in general will penalize women’s 
different experiences and women’s departures from a stereotypical norm.”). 
386 See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (reversing female defendant’s 
murder conviction in part because jury was instructed to measure her beliefs and actions 
against that of a reasonable man in the same circumstances when they should have taken into 
account her gender in deciding her claim of self-defense).  Some courts have held that in 
cases involving battered women claiming self-defense, evidence of battered woman 
syndrome is relevant to the reasonableness determination.  See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 
P.2d 572, 646 (Kan. 1988) (“In cases involving battered spouses, expert evidence of the 
battered woman syndrome is relevant to a determination of the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s perception of danger.”). 
387 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
388 Raigrodski, supra note 366, at 214–15. 
389 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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within the reasonableness framework that the Court has openly embraced.  
Even though reasonableness review to date has tended to result in rulings 
favoring the government, there is no reason why reasonableness review has 
to be deferential, pro-government, or anti-progressive. 
2. How the Erosion of the Container Doctrine Harms the Homeless and the 
Urban Poor 
One underappreciated ramification of the erosion of the Container 
Doctrine is its impact on the homeless and the urban poor, and its 
corresponding impact on poor people of color living in the inner city.390  As 
Lenese Herbert notes, “[T]he police in high-crime neighborhoods often 
violate the [Fourth Amendment’s] strictures and regularly reach inside (and 
often empty) pockets, bags, hats, purses, and other effects without having 
sufficient suspicion that the stopped individuals are armed.”391
The confluence of several factors contributes to this state of affairs.  
First, police do most of their policing in poor, high crime neighborhoods.
 
392  
Second, the homeless and the urban poor spend more time outside their 
homes and on the street where they are more vulnerable to being stopped 
and searched.393
Because police tend to focus their crime-fighting activities in poor 
urban neighborhoods,
   
394
 
390 Here, I borrow from William Stuntz’s definition of the “poor.” Stuntz explains, “[B]y 
‘poor’ or ‘lower-class’ or ‘downscale’ communities, I mean communities in which 
unemployment is high, legally acquired wealth and income are low, and educational and 
social resources are below par.”  William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1795, 1801 (1998). 
 one is more likely to be stopped and searched if 
one lives in a low income, high crime neighborhood than if one lives in a 
more affluent area.  If the search uncovers incriminating evidence, that 
search is likely to be upheld as lawful.  This is because lower courts 
deciding whether police had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop and 
frisk an individual tend to give enormous weight to the location where the 
391 Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a 
Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 137 (2002). 
392 Cynthia Hujar Orr, Meet Marcel Johnson, CHAMPION, Apr. 2010, at 14 (“It is a reality 
that the police more heavily patrol poor urban neighborhoods where the majority of the 
population is Latino or Black.”). 
393 See infra text accompanying notes 403–410. 
394 See Orr, supra note 392, at 14 (noting that police more heavily patrol poor urban 
neighborhoods); see also Russell L. Weaver, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the 
Silencing of the American Poor, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277, 282 (2010) (noting that police 
are more likely to conduct surveillance in poor urban neighborhoods populated by racial 
minorities). 
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stop took place.395  If the stop takes place in a “high crime” or “high drug 
activity” area, little else is necessary for the court to find the requisite 
reasonable suspicion.396
Many poor people of color live in high crime neighborhoods.  This 
does not mean that poor racial minorities are more likely than others to 
engage in criminal activity.  As I. Bennett Capers observes, “Crime tends to 
be high in minority neighborhoods not because of the presence of 
minorities, but largely because the neighborhoods themselves tend to be 
criminogenic due to disproportionate lack of educational opportunities, 
jobs, services, and concern.”
 
397  Many poor people of color live in high 
crime neighborhoods because they cannot afford to live in better 
neighborhoods.  Unfortunately, location often serves as “a proxy for race or 
ethnicity.”398  As Lewis Katz notes, “By sanctioning investigative stops on 
little more than the area in which the stop takes place, the phrase ‘high 
crime area’ has the effect of criminalizing race.”399
One study found that stops and frisks by New York City police 
officers were disproportionately concentrated in the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods, which also happened to be the neighborhoods with the 
highest concentrations of racial minorities.
 
400  The study also found that 
poor persons of color were more likely than white individuals to be stopped, 
questioned, searched and arrested by police.401
In many courts an individual’s presence in a high crime location plus evasion of the 
police equals suspicion reasonable enough to allow a stop under Terry.  African 
Americans, Hispanic Americans, and poor people are likely to find themselves in such 
high crime areas, simply because they live and work there.  If these people choose to 
avoid the police—a choice they have the constitutional right to make—the police may 
stop them.  If the location is not just a high crime area but a location known for drug 
activity, the police may go further: They may search the individual, performing a 
Terry pat-down.  In other words, every person who works or lives in a high crime area 
  David Harris explains why 
blacks and Latinos living in poor, high crime neighborhoods tend to receive 
disproportionate police scrutiny: 
 
395 Katz, supra note 256, at 493 (“Consequently, lower courts give enormous weight to 
this collateral factor, often requiring little more than some other innocuous bits of 
information to fulfill the reasonable suspicion requirement justifying a stop.  Thus, ‘high 
crime area’ becomes a centerpiece of the Terry analysis, serving almost as a talismanic 
signal justifying investigative stops.”). 
396 Id. 
397 I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 49 
(2009). 
398 Katz, supra note 256, at 493.  
399 Id. 
400 Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and 
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 477 (2007). 
401 Id. at 458. 
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and who avoids the police is subject to automatic seizure, and to automatic search if 
the crime suspected involves drugs.  Due to the disproportionately high number of 
African Americans and Hispanic Americans living in those areas, they are subject to 
this treatment much more often than are whites.402
A second reason why the erosion of the Container Doctrine 
disproportionately affects the urban poor and the homeless has to do with 
the Court’s focus on protecting reasonable expectations of privacy as the 
primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment.  With privacy at the core of 
Fourth Amendment protections, one’s activities in the privacy of one’s 
home will be more protected than one’s activities on the street.  As William 
Stuntz observes, by focusing on privacy as the primary interest protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, the Court favors those who already have more 
privacy to begin with.
 
403  Those with more money can usually afford to live 
in detached single family dwellings in the suburbs with lots of space 
between their home and the next-door neighbor’s home.404  Those with less 
money often live in crowded, multi-tenant apartment buildings or public 
housing.405
Despite the usual rule that police need a warrant in order to search a 
home, police can search a home shared by multiple tenants without a 
warrant if one of the co-tenants consents to the search.  Under the Court’s 
third-party consent jurisprudence, not only can police search a home 
without a warrant upon receiving consent of a third party with actual 
 
 
402 Harris, supra note 296, at 680–81. 
403 Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1266–67. 
404 Id. at 1270 (“People with more money are more likely to live in detached houses with 
yards; people with less money are more likely to live in apartment buildings with common 
hallways.”); see also SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND 
ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR 89 (2006) (noting that “[i]n suburban and middle- and upper-
income communities, the boundaries between the home and the outside world can be 
maintained intact,” whereas in poor urban neighborhoods, “private space is at a premium, if 
not a luxury”).  That wealthy people tend to live in detached houses may not be the case in 
all cities.  For example, many affluent individuals in Washington, D.C. choose to live in 
Georgetown, Capitol Hill, or Dupont Circle where million dollar homes are often rowhouses 
which share adjoining walls.  However, wealthy people rarely live in crowded multi-tenant 
apartment buildings. 
405 Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1270.  Carrie Leonetti observes that lower courts tend to 
treat the common areas of an apartment building, including the hallways, as open fields, 
which means police can enter these areas without a warrant or any justification.  Carrie 
Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and 
Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 297 (2005) (arguing that lower courts should 
treat the hallway area just outside a tenant’s apartment as curtilage, not open fields).  Police 
sometimes engage in warrantless, suspicionless searches of residents of public housing.  See 
Adam Carlis, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2002, 2002 (2009) 
(“[R]ecent years have brought systematic, suspicionless searches of [public housing] 
residents’ homes.”). 
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authority, i.e., mutual use of the property or joint access or control,406 but 
police can also search the home without a warrant even if it turns out the 
person does not in fact have the requisite actual authority.407  As long as a 
reviewing court finds that the officer’s belief was reasonable, the consent 
will be deemed valid.408
The Fourth Amendment provides even less protection for the homes of 
the homeless.  Lower courts routinely hold that homeless persons lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes when that home is a 
cardboard box or some other fixture on public property, either because the 
homeless person cannot claim an ownership interest in the property or 
because his home is open to public view.
 
409
If one has a nice home, one is likely to spend time relaxing or 
entertaining within one’s home.  If one lives in a crowded, noisy, multi-
tenant apartment building, or in a place with little privacy like a shelter, one 




406 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (“The authority which 
justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property . . . but rests rather on 
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most 
purposes . . . .”). 
  
Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh studied the lives of the urban poor and found that 
407 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
408 Id. 
409 See, e.g., United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472–73 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that homeless man did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in cave on 
government land where he lived); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 152 (Conn. 1991) 
(finding that homeless person lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in area under 
public bridge where he slept and kept his personal belongings); People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 610, 613 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding that homeless person residing in cardboard box 
on public sidewalk in violation of city ordinance lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his home); State v. Cleator, 857 P. 2d 306, 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (finding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in tent unlawfully erected on public property); see also 
David H. Steinberg, Constructing Homes for the Homeless? Searching for a Fourth 
Amendment Standard, 41 DUKE L.J. 1508, 1538 (1992) (supporting the holding in Mooney 
on the ground that Mooney, who lacked any positive entitlement to the land on which he 
lived, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that land).  But see United States v. 
Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660–61 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy 
in tent erected on government property).  Little has been written on whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to protect the belongings of individuals in homeless shelters against 
warrantless searches.  See Steven R. Morrison, The Fourth Amendment’s Applicability to 
Residents of Homeless Shelters, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 319, 321 (2009) (“[O]nly a handful of 
opinions have dealt with the Fourth Amendment’s applicability [to] homeless shelters.”). 
410 Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1272 (“It is poor people in cities who tend to live in large 
apartment buildings, to travel by bus or subway, and because of a combination of income 
and concentrated population, to spend more time on the street than do people in other 
places.”); see also VENKATESH, supra note 404, at 172 (“People are pushed outside by 
overcrowding, families’ ‘doubling up’ to pay rent, and the generally inhospitable condition 
of apartments.”). 
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“[w]hat some might see as a mass of Americans lying about, and out of 
work, is in many cases an ensemble of persons who lack private places 
where they can rest.”411  William Stuntz observes that it is common to see 
people in poor urban neighborhoods hanging out on the street at all hours of 
the night and day because sitting on one’s front stoop or wandering the 
streets and talking to neighbors is less costly than other forms of 
entertainment.412
Encounters between the police and individuals on the street are much 
more common than searches within the home that generally require a 
warrant.
 
413  On the street, police do not need a warrant to stop and question 
individuals or engage in a host of investigative activity that can culminate 
in the search of a portable container.414  For example, on the street, an 
officer can walk up to an individual and question him for any reason or no 
reason at all as long as a reasonable person in the individual’s shoes would 
feel free to leave.415  Of course, the average person would not feel free to 
leave if an officer stopped him or her and started asking questions.416  
Nonetheless, in numerous cases the Court has declined to find that a seizure 
of the person occurred under facts strongly suggesting that the average 
person in the defendant’s shoes would not have felt free to leave.417
 
411 VENKATESH, supra note 
 
404, at 172; see also SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, GANG 
LEADER FOR A DAY: A ROGUE SOCIOLOGIST TAKES TO THE STREETS (2008) (describing the 
life of a gang leader and other individuals living in a public housing project in Chicago). 
412 Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1271. 
413 William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1016, 1062 (1995) (“[T]here are many, many more street encounters than searches 
of homes.”). 
414 Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1271 (“Fourth Amendment law makes it easy for police to 
stop and search pedestrians.”). 
415 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 209 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A 
perfect example of police conduct that supports no colorable claim of seizure is the act of an 
officer who simply goes up to a pedestrian on the street and asks him a question.”); Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (“[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by 
asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the 
person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence . . . his voluntary answers to such 
questions.”). 
416 In the first empirical study of its kind, David Kessler surveyed 406 randomly selected 
Boston residents and found that most would not feel free to terminate an encounter with 
police, even with knowledge of the right to leave.  David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An 
Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 51, 74–78 (2009).  Kessler also found that women and young people under 
the age of twenty-five would feel even less free to leave than men and adults over the age of 
twenty-five.  Id. at 75. 
417 See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197–99, 203 (finding no seizure of bus passengers 
where three plainclothes officers with visible badges and concealed weapons boarded bus 
and one officer knelt on driver’s seat and faced the rear while the other two officers walked 
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On the street, an officer with very little justification—the Court calls it 
reasonable suspicion—can briefly detain an individual and perform a pat-
down frisk of the person’s outer clothing in a search for weapons.418  As 
noted in Part III, even though the officer is supposed to have a reason to 
suspect the individual is armed and dangerous prior to conducting the frisk, 
courts often assume that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity gives rise 
to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.419  If the 
officer comes across a container on the suspect during the frisk, he may 
open that container without a warrant and it is likely that a court will uphold 
his warrantless search.420
On the street, a police officer does not need a warrant to arrest an 
individual as long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a crime 
has been committed and that the arrestee committed it.
 
421  Once the officer 
arrests the individual, he can conduct a full search of the arrestee’s 
person.422  Incident to arrest, he can search any containers on the arrestee’s 
person423 or within the arrestee’s wingspan.424
In the workplace, the focus on reasonable expectations of privacy 
means the Fourth Amendment protects the interests of white-collar workers 
more than blue-collar workers.  If police want to search an enclosed private 





to the rear of the bus and began asking passengers questions); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 
(1984) (finding no seizure of factory workers where INS agents moved through factory to 
question workers regarding their immigration status while other INS agents stood near the 
exits); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (finding no seizure where 
defendant was approached by DEA agents while walking through airport concourse, asked to 
show identification and airline ticket, asked why the name on the ticket did not match the 
name on the driver’s license, and asked to accompany the agents to the airport DEA office 
for further questions after her driver’s license and airline ticket were returned to her). 
  People who work in factories, on assembly lines, on shop floors, 
418 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
419 See infra text accompanying notes 292–303. 
420 See infra Part IV.D.2 and IV.D.3 (discussing Minnesota v. Dickerson and Illinois v. 
Wardlow). 
421 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
422 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
423 Id. 
424 Id.; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
425 Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1270.  If an individual works for the government, however, 
his or her office might be searched without a warrant if a court finds that the governmental 
interests outweigh the individual’s privacy interests.  O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 
719–20 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, 
we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against 
the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the 
workplace.”).  Without deciding whether the search before it was reasonable, the O’Connor 
Court held that “public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy 
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or in hotel kitchens, however, usually do not have offices, so the police can 
often enter and observe their workplaces without a warrant.426
One might think that when it comes to cars, the Fourth Amendment 
treats wealthy and poor drivers alike.  Regardless of whether you are 
wealthy or poor, a police officer can search your car without a warrant as 
long as the officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime 
within the car.  As Stuntz notes, “[O]ne can enjoy as much, or as little, 
privacy in an old Chevrolet as in a new Lexus.”
 
427  Even though all drivers, 
in theory, are treated alike, in reality, black and Latino drivers are stopped 
at rates greatly disproportionate to their numbers in the community, and 
their cars are more often searched than the cars of white drivers.428  
Moreover, the urban poor and middle class often use public transportation 
instead of cars,429 possibly because of the high cost of parking downtown.  
The Fourth Amendment generally treats passengers on subways and buses 
just like pedestrians on the street.430
Since poor and homeless people tend to conduct most of their activity 
on the street, they and the portable containers they carry are more likely to 
be searched without a warrant than individuals and containers that stay 
within the four walls of a home.  Importantly, it is not just poor and 
homeless criminals who are affected by the erosion of protection for 
containers on the street.  Poor and homeless individuals who lead law-
abiding lives are also more likely to have their expectations of privacy 
intruded upon than more wealthy individuals who spend less of their time 
on the street. 
 
 
interests of government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as 
for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of 
reasonableness under all the circumstances.”  Id. at 725–26.  In other words, a government 
employer might not need a search warrant to search a government employee’s office. 
426 Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1271. 
427 Id. 
428 DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 
79–80 (2002) (noting that during 1995 and 1996, blacks, who constituted only 17% of all 
drivers, made up 70% of drivers who were stopped and searched by Maryland State Police 
and that in 2000, black and Latino drivers constituted 78% of all drivers on the southern end 
of the New Jersey turnpike who were stopped and searched by New Jersey State Police); 
David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court 
and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 560 (1997); see also 
Capers, supra note 397, at 67 (noting that a recent study of police stops in two 
predominantly white suburban communities found that African-American drivers had license 
plate query rates that were 325% and 383% greater than those of the general driver 
population). 
429 Stuntz, supra note 354, at 1271. 
430 Id. 
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B. BORROWING FROM THE COURT’S EQUAL PROTECTION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Under the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, if a law 
burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class, such as race, 
alienage, or national origin, the reviewing court must apply strict scrutiny 
review, striking down the legislation unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.431  If legislation discriminates on the 
basis of gender, the reviewing court will apply heightened or intermediate 
scrutiny, striking down the legislation if it fails to substantially further an 
important governmental purpose.432  If a law does not burden a fundamental 
right or target a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, the Court will 
uphold the legislation as long as the classification bears “a rational relation 
to some legitimate end.”433
In most cases, the level of scrutiny employed effectively predetermines 
whether the legislation will be struck down as constitutionally infirm or 
upheld.  If strict or intermediate scrutiny applies, the legislation will almost 
always be struck down, leading Gerald Gunther to remark that strict 
scrutiny review is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”
 
434  On the other hand, 
if rational basis review is the applicable standard, the challenged legislation 
will almost always be upheld.435
 
431 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
  When a court applies rational basis 
432 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723–24 (1982) (noting that when a 
statute classifies individuals on the basis of gender, the party seeking to uphold the statute 
must show “that the classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the 
discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives’”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional 
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”).  A classification based on illegitimacy, which is considered a quasi-suspect 
classification, is also subject to heightened review.  See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 
461 (1988) (noting that intermediate scrutiny has been applied to discriminatory 
classifications based on illegitimacy); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1982) 
(noting that restrictions based on illegitimacy “will survive equal protection scrutiny to the 
extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest”).  But see Mass. Bd. of Ret. 
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to classification 
based on age). 
433 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); see also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 
(“The general rule is that [such] legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if 
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).  
434 Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
435 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
297, 304 (1997) (“The rational basis test is extremely permissive, and in the case of 
economic or social legislation has traditionally led to almost automatic approval.”); Robert 
C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term 
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review, it gives the legislature wide latitude because it is presumed that 
even improvident or unwise social or economic legislation will eventually 
be corrected through the democratic process.436
In three rare cases, which Cass Sunstein calls the “Moreno-Cleburne-
Romer Triology,” the Supreme Court struck down legislation that 
discriminated against politically unpopular groups using rational basis 
review that looked more like heightened scrutiny.
 
437  In Moreno, Cleburne, 
and Romer, the Court did not do what it usually does when it applies 
rational basis review.  Instead of rubber-stamping the legislation in 
question, the Court scrutinized the reasons provided by the State, 
discredited the State’s purported motives, and struck down the legislation 
on the ground that it was not supported by a legitimate governmental 
interest.438  As others have put it, the Court applied “rational basis with 
bite.”439
The Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy involved legislation that harmed 
a group the Court considered politically unpopular, but not suspect or quasi-
suspect.  The legislation in Moreno, which barred individuals who lived in 
households with at least one unrelated person from obtaining food stamps, 




Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999) (noting that rationality review is 
“ordinarily deferential and minimal”). 
  
The legislation in Cleburne made it harder for group homes for people with 
436 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
437 Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59, 61 (1996).  
Robert Farrell notes that the Court has struck down social and economic legislation using 
rational basis with bite on several other occasions.  Farrell, supra note 435, at 357 (claiming 
that between 1971 and 1996, the Court decided ten successful rational basis claims while 
rejecting rational basis arguments in one hundred cases). 
438 See Sunstein, supra note 437, at 59–63. 
439 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 435, at 327 (noting that Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer 
have been categorized as cases applying “rational basis review with bite”); Gunther, supra 
note 434, at 18–19 (noting that in seven of the fifteen basic equal protection decisions in the 
1971 term, “the Court upheld the [equal protection] claim or remanded it for consideration 
without mentioning the ‘strict scrutiny’ formula,” thus finding “bite in the equal protection 
cases after explicitly voicing the traditionally toothless minimal scrutiny standard”); see also 
Gayle Lynne Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By Any Other 
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s use of rational basis review 
with bite and arguing that this type of review is just intermediate scrutiny in disguise); 
Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on 
Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s failure to 
articulate the factors triggering rational basis with bite review has led to confusion in the 
lower courts). 
440 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530, 534–35 (1973). 
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mental disabilities to meet certain zoning requirements.441  The legislation 
in Romer treated gays and lesbians differently than heterosexuals by 
prohibiting any legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect 
gays and lesbians from discrimination.442
Not requiring police to get a warrant before searching a portable 
container, the net effect of the erosion of the Container Doctrine, also 
disproportionately harms two politically powerless groups—the homeless 
and the urban poor.
  Underlying each of these cases 
was the belief that the majoritarian democratic process would not correct 
legislation that disadvantaged a politically unpopular group. 
443
 
441 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436–37.  For an insightful analysis of the Cleburne 
decision, see Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally 
Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 
111, 113–40 (1987). 
  Borrowing from the Court’s rational basis with bite 
jurisprudence, I suggest that when the government claims that an exception 
to the warrant requirement justifies a warrantless search of a container, in 
addition to deciding whether the requirements of the exception have been 
satisfied, the reviewing court should conduct a non-deferential inquiry into 
the overall reasonableness of the search.  In other words, just as the Court 
has applied rational basis review with bite when social and economic 
442 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
443 See Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. 
L. REV. 211, 273–75 (2003) (discussing the legal and practical obstacles that prevent or 
discourage the poor and the homeless from voting).  The erosion of the Container Doctrine 
also harms another group—those caught with contraband or evidence of a crime in their 
portable containers who become criminal defendants.  Many scholars have argued that 
criminal defendants are a politically unpopular or disfavored group.  See generally Donald 
A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why 
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1079 (1993) (arguing that legislatures undervalue the rights of the accused); Adam M. 
Gershowitz, Imposing a Gap on Capital Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. 73, 116–17 (2007) 
(arguing that the unpopularity of criminal defendants make them the quintessential discrete 
and insular minority); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 
594 (2005) (arguing that criminal defendants are an unpopular group); David A. Sklansky, 
Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1290 
(2002) (noting that criminal defendants as a group are “peculiarly powerless to protect 
themselves through the normal processes of majoritarian democracy.”); William J. Stuntz, 
Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20–21 
(1996) (arguing that criminal suspects as a group find it hard or impossible to protect 
themselves through the political process).  But see Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the 
“American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (2004) (arguing that the federalization of crime exposes politically 
prominent individuals, including members of Congress, to the criminal justice system and 
thus ensures that lawmakers will not be wholly antagonistic to criminal defendants). 
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legislation harms a politically unpopular group, the Court should apply 
reasonableness review with teeth to warrantless container searches.444
At first glance, rational basis review in the equal protection context 
seems conceptually distinct from the reasonableness of a search or seizure 
in the Fourth Amendment context.  Rational basis review focuses on 
whether there is a legitimate reason for a particular piece of legislation.  
Reasonableness review, in contrast, balances individual versus 
governmental interests to decide the propriety of a governmental intrusion 
on privacy.  Comparing the two, however, is useful because both standards 
typically accord great deference to the government.  In its equal protection 
jurisprudence, the Court has recognized that rational basis review does not 
always have to be deferential to the government.  I suggest that non-
deferential review is even more appropriate in the Fourth Amendment 
context given the desire to check executive discretion that led the Framers 
to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Reasonableness with teeth offers the advantage of flexibility and 
attention to context that constitutes one of the strengths of regular 
reasonableness review.  At the same time, reasonableness with teeth is 
better than normal reasonableness review because it is less deferential to the 
government.  An anti-deference rule is particularly important in the Fourth 
Amendment context given the original concerns that motivated the Framers 
to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.  The Fourth 
Amendment was intended to act as a check on executive discretion.  More 
searching judicial review of police search decisions comports with the 
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment. 
Moreover, reasonableness with teeth can and should be more 
determinate than normal reasonableness review.  By spelling out the factors 
that lower courts should take into consideration when deciding whether a 
given search passes constitutional muster under reasonableness with teeth, 
the Court can provide guidance to lower courts and litigants as to when a 
particular search passes constitutional muster. 
One might object to my proposal on the ground that in the Moreno-
Cleburne-Evans trilogy, the Court was dealing with legislation it felt was 
motivated by animus toward a politically unpopular group whereas in the 
container search cases, there is no legislation designed to disadvantage the 
homeless or the urban poor.  The ability to search containers without a 
warrant comes from judicial opinions, not legislation, and the 
 
444 The ease with which police officers can obtain search warrants suggests non-
deferential reasonableness review might be appropriate even in cases where the police 
obtained a search warrant.  See Bascuas, supra note 28, at 580 (arguing that a search warrant 
“offers little if any protection against government invasions of private property and serves 
primarily to obviate adversarial challenge”). 
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disproportionate effect that the erosion of the Container Doctrine has on the 
homeless and urban poor is simply the unhappy by-product not of animus, 
but of court decisions favoring reasonableness over warrants.  There is little 
evidence to suggest that law enforcement officers who search containers are 
intentionally targeting the homeless and the poor.  The Court’s 
jurisprudence on container searches simply happens to have the unfortunate 
side effect of disproportionately burdening a politically unpopular group. 
I have several responses to this objection.  First, the fact that the Court 
in Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy was reviewing legislation whereas 
courts reviewing container searches are reviewing police decisions to search 
is a distinction without a difference, at least in this context.  In both 
instances, a branch of the government—the legislature in the equal 
protection arena and the executive in the Fourth Amendment context—is 
acting in a way that disproportionately hurts a politically unpopular group.  
Because the political process is unlikely to correct itself when non-
majoritarian interests are disadvantaged, extra safeguards must be 
implemented to protect the harmed group when it is a politically unpopular 
minority.  Moreover, one reason for judicial deference to legislatures under 
the usual rational basis test is because legislatures enjoy a strong 
presumption of legitimacy.445  Given the history of overreaching which led 
the Framers to adopt the Fourth Amendment, courts should not presume 
legitimacy when it comes to police decisions to search.446
Second, the fact that the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy dealt with 
legislative acts that appeared to intentionally discriminate against a 
politically unpopular group does not mean reasonableness review with teeth 
cannot be applied in the container search context where there is no evidence 
that courts or police officers are intentionally discriminating against the 
homeless and the poor.  The discriminatory intent requirement in equal 
protection jurisprudence has been heavily criticized as misguided in light of 
overwhelming social science research showing that much of the 





445 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
 
446 See Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless 
Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 143 (2007) (arguing that a court should strictly 
scrutinize searches and seizures involving excessive executive discretion or the lack of 
legislative authorization, which is the case in the run-of-the-mill police search). 
447 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506–08 (2005); 
Jerry Kang & Mazharin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic 
Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 536–41 (2008) (discussing recent social science 
research on race and implicit bias).  See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of 
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
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In the container search context, we may not have a government actor 
or institution that is intentionally targeting a politically unpopular group, 
but that is beside the point.  Even if there is no animus or intent to 
discriminate, favoring the containers of the wealthy over the containers of 
the poor at best reflects indifference; at worst, it indicates a callous 
disregard for the rights of the less wealthy and less fortunate.  In a society 
that prides itself on equal application of the law, we should strive to ensure 
that Fourth Amendment protections do not skew in favor of the wealthy 
over the poor.  Ensuring equal protection of the rich and poor here is 
especially important because the Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures is explicitly protected by the 
Constitution. 
A second possible objection to non-deferential reasonableness review 
of warrantless container searches might be that the Court has explicitly 
refused to recognize the poor as a suspect class.448  Heightened review, this 
argument would continue, is only merited when a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class is affected by the challenged governmental action.  This is a weak 
objection, given that the Court similarly refused to recognize hippies, the 
mentally disabled, and gays and lesbians as suspect classes in Moreno, 
Cleburne, and Romer, yet applied non-deferential review in these cases.449
Moreover, support for a heightened standard of review in container 
search cases can be found in other equal protection cases in which the Court 
struck down legislation that disproportionately burdened the poor.  Notably, 
in each of these cases, the Court did not require proof of intent to 
discriminate against the poor.  Moreover, unlike in the container search 
cases where the poor are burdened in the exercise of an explicit 
constitutional right—the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures—the challenged legislation in each of these cases harmed the poor 




Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
 
448 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting that the 
poor are not a suspect class because they are “not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected 
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process”). 
449 Romer, 517 U.S. at 624; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 47 U.S. 432, 436–
37 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 530, 534–35 (1973). 
450 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1966) (right to vote 
in state elections not explicitly in the U.S. Constitution); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 630–31 (1969) (right to travel from state to state not explicitly in the Constitution), 
overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
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For example, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court 
struck down Virginia’s poll tax on equal protection grounds.451  Section 173 
of the Virginia Constitution directed the General Assembly to levy an 
annual poll tax not exceeding $1.50 on every resident twenty-one years or 
older.452  Section 18 of the Virginia Constitution made payment of poll 
taxes a precondition for voting in state elections.453  Even though there is no 
explicit constitutional right to vote in state elections,454 the Court found 
Virginia’s poll tax violative of equal protection because it discriminated 
against the poor in the exercise of their right of suffrage.455
Similarly, in Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court struck down statutory 
provisions denying welfare benefits to indigents who had not resided in the 
state for at least one year on equal protection grounds.
 
456  The Court held 
the durational residency provisions unconstitutional because they infringed 
on the poor’s exercise of their constitutional right to travel.457  The Court 
acknowledged that the Constitution contains no explicit right to travel, but 
suggested such a right is implied in the Privileges and Immunities 
Clauses.458
I am not the first legal scholar to suggest that the Court should borrow 
from its equal protection jurisprudence when deciding whether the Fourth 
Amendment has been violated.  Scott Sundby has argued that the Court’s 
reasonableness balancing test should be replaced with a strict scrutiny 





451 Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. 
  To reconcile the tension between the Warrant Preference and 
452 Id. at 664 n.1. 
453 Id. 
454 Id. at 665. 
455 Id. at 668 (“[T]he interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the 
power to fix qualifications.  Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability 
to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”). 
456 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
457 Id. at 627. 
458 Id. at 630 n.8. 
459 Sundby, supra note 20, at 431 (“[T]he soundest alternative to the Court’s current 
vague balancing test is a single-tiered strict scrutiny standard based on a compelling 
government interest-least intrusive means test.”); see also Holly, supra note 21, at 340–41 
(arguing that the current reasonableness balancing approach to the Fourth Amendment 
should be abandoned and that the Court should return to the warrant requirement and 
examine warrantless searches with strict scrutiny); Kevin C. Newsom, Recent Development, 
Suspicionless Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment: Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 213 (1995) (arguing that 
the Court should “replace its freewheeling ‘reasonableness’ analysis with the familiar 
standard of strict scrutiny in evaluating government searches”); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth 
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the Separate Clauses views, Sundby proposes a composite model of the 
Fourth Amendment under which initiatory intrusions—intrusions in which 
the government initiates the investigative activity in the absence of any 
suspicious behavior—are evaluated for reasonableness and responsive or 
investigatory intrusions—where the government investigation is based upon 
particularized suspicion—are analyzed under the warrant clause.460  Under 
Sundby’s proposal, an initiatory intrusion should be deemed reasonable 
only if there is a compelling governmental interest and the intrusion is the 
least intrusive means to achieve that governmental interest.461  Sundby 
argues that a strict scrutiny standard for initiatory intrusions would provide 
a more structured reasonableness inquiry than the current balancing test.462  
Under Sundby’s proposal, an investigatory intrusion would require a 
warrant based on probable cause.463
Another leading Fourth Amendment scholar, Christopher Slobogin, 
has argued that “Fourth Amendment analysis should mimic equal protection 




Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive 
Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1189 (1988) (arguing for a least intrusive 
means analysis to inform the reasonableness balancing analysis because “alleged violations 
of fourth amendment rights should . . . be subjected to judicial scrutiny which is at least as 
strict as that applied to alleged violations of other constitutional rights”).  Additionally, 
Robert Logan argues that the Court should utilize a variation of its equal protection three-
tiered standard of review model when it analyzes its special needs cases.  Robert S. Logan, 
The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New Methodology for “Special Needs” Cases, 68 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447 (2000).  A few student authors have argued that the Court should 
apply intermediate scrutiny in certain Fourth Amendment contexts.  See, e.g., John P. 
Cronan, Note, Subjecting the Fourth Amendment to Intermediate Scrutiny: The 
Reasonableness of Media Ride-Alongs, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 949, 959 (1999) (arguing 
for intermediate scrutiny of media ride-alongs); John S. Morgan, Comment, The Junking of 
the Fourth Amendment: Illinois v. Krull and New York v. Burger, 63 TUL. L. REV. 335, 371 
(1988) (arguing for intermediate scrutiny of searches of closely regulated businesses). 
  Unlike Sundby who 
finds Terry problematic, Slobogin thinks the Court in Terry got it right by 
adjusting the amount of justification needed (reasonable suspicion rather 
than probable cause) to account for the level of intrusiveness of the seizure 
(a brief, investigatory detention rather than a prolonged arrest).  Slobogin 
argues that Terry’s sliding scale approach should be extended to all 
searches and seizures such that courts evaluating the reasonableness of a 
460 Sundby, supra note 20, at 418–19. 
461 Id. at 431. 
462 Id. 
463 Id. at 418–19. 
464 Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the 
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1089 (1998). 
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search or seizure “should demand from the government a specific showing 
of need that is proportionate to the invasion.”465
Over the years, various Supreme Court Justices have expressed 
support for a sliding scale approach as well.  In 1949, for example, Justice 
Robert Jackson, dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, argued that if a 
child were kidnapped, the police would be justified in setting up a 
roadblock and searching every outgoing car without probable cause, even if 




[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored 
roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or catch a dangerous criminal 
who is likely to flee by a particular route.  The exigencies created by these scenarios 
are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities might simply stop 
cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the 
jurisdiction.
  More recently, in 2000, Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, echoed Justice Jackson’s 
sentiments, suggesting that the validity of a roadblock might turn on the 
purpose for which the roadblock was created: 
467
Also in 2000, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Florida v. 
J.L., suggested that a sliding scale approach to reasonable suspicion might 
be appropriate: 
 
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under 
which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search 
even without a showing of reliability.  We do not say, for example, that a report of a 
person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a 
person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.  Nor 
do we hold that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of 
Fourth Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports and schools, cannot 
conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches 
elsewhere.468
In his famous Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures on the Fourth 
Amendment, Anthony Amsterdam pointed out that the Supreme Court has 
already adopted a sliding scale approach in two contexts: 
 
 
465 Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment 
should be read to permit only those surveillance techniques that produce a success rate 
roughly proportionate to the intrusion they visit upon those affected and that intrusiveness 
should be measured empirically); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth 
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 68–75 (1991). 
466 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
467 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000). 
468 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000) (citations omitted). 
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In two cases the Supreme Court has taken just such a sliding scale approach.  The first 
is Terry v. Ohio, the major stop-and-frisk decision, in which the Court authorized 
investigative stops—that is, brief on-the-street detentions accompanied by a frisk or 
patdown for weapons—upon less than probable cause for arrest . . . .  The second case 
is Schmerber v. California, where the Supreme Court said that searches which 
breached the body wall (there, the extraction of blood by means of a hypodermic 
needle), intruding more upon the “interests in human dignity and privacy” than do 
external body searches, require greater justification.  Together, Terry and Schmerber 
might support a general fourth amendment theory that increasing degrees of 
intrusiveness require increasing degrees of justification and increasingly stringent 
procedures for the establishment of that justification.469
Adopting a sliding scale approach could pose a variety of problems.  
Anthony Amsterdam notes that a sliding scale approach would likely 
“produce more slide than scale”
 
470 and result in the Fourth Amendment 
becoming an “immense Rorschach blot.”471
Scott Sundby points out that a sliding scale approach could also 
decimate the already fragile remains of the warrant requirement: 
  Moreover, if Fourth 
Amendment protections are calibrated to depend on the nature and 
seriousness of the alleged offense or threat involved, an innocent individual 
might find himself the subject of a warrantless search that is upheld as 
reasonable because the officer suspected the individual of acts relating to 
terrorism.  In this post 9/11 era, an officer might be too quick to assume he 
is dealing with a terrorist suspect, which would enable him to search with a 
very low level of justification under a sliding scale approach. 
[A] sliding scale model, placing complete emphasis on the reasonableness clause such 
that a reasonableness balancing test would apply to all searches and seizures, also 
poses significant problems.  The model presents textual difficulties by failing to 
provide an independent role for the amendment’s one concrete requirement of a 
warrant based on probable cause.  Under the sliding-scale model, the Court could 
conclude that the fourth amendment never required a warrant based on probable cause 
as a prerequisite to a reasonable search or seizure.  Although the Court would 
probably not adopt such an extreme reading, the mere probability illustrates how the 
sliding-scale model fails to account for the warrant clause’s presence in the 
amendment’s text.472
At the other end of the spectrum, Richard Worf uses political process 
theory to argue for highly deferential judicial review, akin to rational basis 
 
 
469 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 390 (1974). 
470 Id. at 394. 
471 Id. at 393. 
472 Sundby, supra note 20, at 416–17; see also Alschuler, supra note 37, at 263 (“A view 
of the fourth amendment that treats probable cause as a unitary standard while authorizing 
departures from this standard when police intrusions seem relatively minor effectively makes 
warrants unavailable as a means of controlling the lesser or second-tier intrusions.”). 
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review, of searches authorized by legislative action.473  Worf starts from the 
assumption that a statute should prevail over a judge’s interpretation of that 
statute.474  This is because “the majoritarian decision of the legislature 
should ordinarily be preferred to the decisions of unelected and 
unaccountable judges.”475  In Worf’s view, more stringent judicial review is 
justified “if, and only if, it has [a] democracy-enhancing effect.”476  Thus, if 
a law burdens a discrete and insular minority, heightened judicial scrutiny 
may be necessary to “help to replicate the result that would have been 
obtained in a more perfect democracy where everyone is represented.”477
Worf would recognize five exceptions to his general rule that courts 
should defer to the legislature and apply normal rational basis review when 
reviewing searches and seizures for constitutionality.  He would support 
heightened judicial scrutiny when there is: (1) no legislative authorization 
for the challenged governmental action, (2) excessive executive discretion, 
(3) discrimination against a discrete and insular minority, (4) no rational 




Sundby’s composite model may be too complex to provide simple 
guidance to the average police officer in the field needing to know in 
advance what is required before he can perform a search or seizure and 
Slobogin’s sliding scale approach may enable the police to engage in more 
warrantless searches and seizures than currently allowed.  Nonetheless, I 
agree with both Sundby and Slobogin that heightened non-deferential 
judicial review of the constitutionality of most governmental searches and 
seizures is appropriate.  Heightened scrutiny is far superior to the current 
  Because the run-of-the-mill Fourth Amendment case 
involves an individual police officer’s decision to search or seize, 
heightened judicial scrutiny would seem to be appropriate in most Fourth 
Amendment cases even under Worf’s scheme.  Only in the arena of 
administrative searches where the legislature has authorized a broad-based 
type of search, such as checkpoints to check for sobriety and immigration 
checkpoints to check immigration status, would extremely deferential 
rational basis review apply.  I am not persuaded that courts should ever 
completely defer to legislatures in the Fourth Amendment context, but do 
agree with Worf that in the five types of cases Worf identifies as exceptions 
to his general rule of judicial deference to the legislature, heightened 
judicial scrutiny is appropriate. 
 
473 See generally Worf, supra note 446. 
474 Id. at 101. 
475 Id. 
476 Id. at 102. 
477 Id. 
478 Id. at 161–62. 
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balancing with a thumb-on-the-scale-in-favor-of-the-government that 
currently takes place. 
Unlike Sundby, Slobogin, and others, I do not argue for a strict 
scrutiny standard of review because the Court has already rejected strict 
scrutiny in the Fourth Amendment context.  The Court has on numerous 
occasions stated that the government is not required to use the least 
intrusive means available to be in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment.479  In the administrative search context where there is an 
explicit evaluation of the purported governmental interest, the Court does 
not require that the governmental interest be “compelling” in the usual 
sense of the word in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment.480
Strict scrutiny may also be overly discretion-constraining.  As noted 
above, in the equal protection context, whenever government action affects 
a suspect class or the exercise of a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is 




479 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010) (“This Court has repeatedly 
refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.”) (internal quotation omitted); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
92 of Pottawatomie City v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly 
stated that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require employing the least 
intrusive means . . . .”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) (“We 
have repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) 
(“The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or 
invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.”). 
  If 
all Fourth Amendment claims are subject to strict scrutiny, either all but a 
few government searches would be deemed unreasonable or strict scrutiny 
would end up not being very strict.  Just as police officers need discretion to 
decide what action is appropriate in the field, courts deciding Fourth 
Amendment claims need discretion to decide whether the challenged 
government action violated the Constitution.  While the current balancing 
test provides too few constraints on the exercise of the reviewing court’s 
discretion, strict scrutiny may provide too many constraints.  Something 
between a completely deferential rational basis standard and strict scrutiny 
is required.  Reasonableness with teeth offers the advantage of heightened 
judicial scrutiny without the discretion-constraining limitations of strict 
scrutiny. 
480 Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (“It is a mistake, however, to think that the phrase 
‘compelling state interest,’ in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum 
quantum of governmental concern . . . .  Rather, the phrase describes an interest that appears 
important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show 
the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.”). 
481 See supra Part V.B 
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In proposing reasonableness with teeth, I do not suggest that the Court 
simply adopt wholesale the “rational basis with bite” standard that it has 
utilized in a minority of its equal protection cases.  The problem with 
borrowing from the Court’s rational basis with bite jurisprudence is that the 
Court has provided little guidance regarding when rational basis with bite is 
appropriate and virtually no guidance with respect to what rational basis 
with bite means besides heightened judicial scrutiny of the challenged 
governmental action.482  Moreover, the Court applies deferential rational 
basis review in most equal protection cases and applies rational basis with 
bite in only a small minority of cases.483
Reasonableness with teeth in the Fourth Amendment context does not 
have to suffer from these same flaws.  First, it is unnecessary to limit 
reasonableness review with teeth to cases in which a politically unpopular 
group has been disadvantaged.  Non-deferential reasonableness review 
should apply to all container searches, not simply those implicating the poor 
and the homeless.  Since the Fourth Amendment requires that all searches 
and seizures be reasonable, not simply those directed at politically 
unpopular groups, reasonableness is already required for all searches and 
seizures.  The only question is what form reasonableness review ought to 
take.  Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires that reasonableness 
review be ultra-deferential.  Indeed, given the reasons why the Fourth 
Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights—the desire to constrain 
arbitrary and exploratory governmental searches and seizures—a non-




482 See Pettinga, supra note 439, at 801 (arguing that because the Court has not 
articulated the factors that trigger rational basis with bite, it can apply heightened scrutiny 
whenever it chooses); Smith, supra note 439, at 2785 (noting that rational basis with bite has 
led to confusion in the lower courts with federal courts continuing to apply normal rational 
basis review and state courts more willing to apply rational basis with bite).  The Court’s 
rational basis with bite jurisprudence is even more unsatisfying given its lack of “a 
harmonious principle obtainable from within the internal logic of the cases themselves.”  
Farrell, supra note 435, at 414.  Gerald Gunther suggested that the rational basis with bite 
cases decided during the Court’s 1971 term might be explained by the Court’s focus on the 
means used by the government to achieve its ends.  Gunther, supra note 434, at 21 (noting 
that under rational basis with bite, the challenged legislation passed constitutional muster as 
long as the means substantially furthered the legislative purpose whereas under strict 
scrutiny, the focus was on whether the government’s ends were compelling).  In contrast, 
when the Court applies strict scrutiny, it focuses on the government’s objectives or ends.  Id.  
In subsequent terms, however, the Court’s rational basis with bite cases have sometimes 
focused on the governmental ends and means and sometimes just on the governmental ends.  
Farrell, supra note 435, at 414–15. 
483 Farrell, supra note 435. 
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Second, the factors relevant to whether a search should be deemed 
reasonable can and should be spelled out in advance, diminishing the 
problems of vagueness and lack of guidance that plague the current 
reasonableness balancing test in the Fourth Amendment.484  The Court can 
provide guidance to lower courts by specifying which factors lower courts 
should consider when conducting reasonableness review with teeth.485
Even if the Court does not provide lower courts with a list of relevant 
factors, the process of appellate decisionmaking can help bring determinacy 
to this area.  Each time the Court decides a container search case using 
reasonableness with teeth, it will set precedent regarding what is or is not 
reasonable.  To a certain extent, this is already being done in the 
administrative search context.  The Supreme Court has made clear that 
sobriety checkpoints are reasonable,
 
486 while checkpoints for narcotics 
interdiction are not reasonable.487  It has held that drug testing of high 
school athletes is reasonable,488 while drug testing of political candidates is 
not reasonable.489
VI. CONCLUSION 
  And it is not just the Supreme Court that can provide 
guidance as to which kinds of searches are reasonable.  The appellate courts 
can play a role here as well. 
In requiring police to get a warrant before searching a container, the 
Container Doctrine put containers on an equal footing with houses.  It also 
 
484 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 
UTAH L. REV. 977, 1026 (“[A]bsent objective criteria for measuring reasonableness, 
progressively intrusive actions have been and will continue to be allowed”).  Spelling out the 
factors that reviewing courts ought to consider when applying non-deferential 
reasonableness with teeth review is beyond the scope of this article.  I plan to address this in 
a future article. 
485 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 126, at 1491 (listing factors that a reviewing court could 
consider when assessing a search for reasonableness); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of 
Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 483 (1995) (arguing that individualized suspicion should be a necessary 
component of reasonableness); Colb, supra note 38 (arguing that a strong showing of 
probable cause should be a prerequisite to a finding of reasonableness).  But see Arcila, 
supra note 309, at 1224 (arguing against an individualized suspicion requirement in the 
administrative search context). 
486 Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoints). 
487 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (striking down checkpoints to check for 
narcotics). 
488 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie City v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 
(2002) (upholding random drug testing of high school students participating in 
extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding 
random drug testing of high school athletes). 
489 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (striking down random drug testing of 
candidates for political office). 
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reflected the Court’s preference for warrants.  Over the past several 
decades, the Court has gradually moved away from requiring warrants in 
most container search cases to permitting warrantless container searches.  
The erosion of the Container Doctrine mirrors the Court’s embrace of 
reasonableness over warrants.  Reasonableness review is problematic both 
because it is indeterminate and because it is highly deferential to the 
government.  The erosion of the Container Doctrine is also problematic 
because it disproportionately harms the homeless and the urban poor. 
It does not appear that the current Court is likely to go back to a strong 
embrace of the Warrant Preference view anytime soon.  Given this reality, I 
suggest borrowing from a slice of the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence and importing the concept of rational basis with bite into the 
Fourth Amendment context.  When evaluating the reasonableness of a 
search or seizure—governmental action that has by definition intruded upon 
a reasonable expectation of privacy or possessory interests—reasonableness 
review should have some non-deferential teeth. 
